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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The recent economic crisis has witnessed the most severe economic downturn in the history 
of the European Union.  Yet not all regions experienced economic decline and rates of 
recovery have varied greatly.  This differentiated experience raises important questions as to 
why some regions prove to be more resilient to economic shocks than others, and what 
influences the observed resilience outcomes.   
 
The ESPON project Economic Crisis: Resilience of Regions (ECR2) examines the geography 
of the economic crisis across the ESPON territory, and explores why some regions are more 
able to withstand an economic downturn than others, or are able to recover faster.  This report 
constitutes the Draft Final Report of the project.  The overall objective of the project has been 
to: 
 
“expose territorial evidence that supports policy-makers at different administrative levels in 
making the economic structure(s) in Europe and its countries, regions and cities more 
resilient to economic crises and a sudden economic downturn.” 
 
In doing so the project has focused on three principal themes: 
 Identifying the territorial impact of the last economic crisis 
 Estimating the territorial resilience of region 
 Understanding the role of territorial policy responses in promoting economic 
resilience 
 
Economic shocks are not particularly rare events and their likely occurrence can be broadly 
foreseen.  The consequences of these shocks are much less predictable, as witnessed by the 
rapid unravelling of the economic order following defaults in the American sub-prime 
mortgage market. The consequences of which were manifested variously as an initial 
financial crisis, which sparked a wide-ranging ‘credit crunch’; a sovereign debt crisis, where 
high levels of public debt (partly driven by the bail out of national banking sectors) proved 
difficult to sustain in financial markets, and a more traditional slump in demand, as adversely 
affected firms and households reduce their expenditure. It is the consequences of an event 
that tends to mark it out as a ‘shock’ to the system and, certainly, to attach the word ‘crisis’. 
The severity of the recent crisis has promoted an increase in the concept of economic 
resilience in the face of economic shocks, amongst both academic researchers and policy-
makers. 
 
Within the developing literature on regional economic resilience, a broad distinction can be 
made between two different conceptions of the term. The first focuses on the resistance of a 
system to shocks and the speed of its return or ‘bounce-back’ to a pre-shock state or 
equilibrium. The faster the system returns to equilibrium, the more resilient it is. The second 
definition is based on an adaptive notion of resilience which views the economic landscape as 
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a complex adaptive system which is in a state of continuous flux.  Here, resilience is defined 
as the capacity of a local or regional economic system to adapt to changing economic 
circumstances.  Combining these two concepts we define resilience as: 
 
“the ability of a regional economy to withstand, absorb or overcome an internal or external 
economic shock”. 
 
The consequences of the economic crisis across the European territory have been well-
documented in recent years.  The variable temporal geography observed as the downturn 
gradually spread from a small number of regions in 2007 to eventually incorporate almost 
90% of the ESPON territory in 2009, reinforces the importance of the dynamic analysis 
adopted by ECR2.  Our own analysis then reinforces the overall picture of falling levels of 
trade and investment followed by falling levels of employment, falling hours of employment, 
rising levels of unemployment, and stagnant wages.  Spatially disaggregated analysis 
highlights the more nuanced territorial dimensions of the crisis, with many territories 
experiencing a different crisis to that experienced by other regions both across and within 
countries.  The varied temporal and spatial geography of the crisis raises interesting questions 
as to the relative performance of regions. 
 
In the relatively short timescale since the onset of the economic crisis, and certainly the 
limited time period for which robust and comparable data is available, we are only able to 
examine the first response of regional and local economies to the consequences of the 
economic crisis.  This provides an important window on the ability of economies to 
withstand, absorb and recover from the first effects of an economic shock.  Our work also 
provides an insight into the first stages of the economic transformations initiated as a 
consequence of the crisis.   
 
The timescale of the study has proved to be advantageous for the study of the resilience, as it 
has allowed qualitative research to be undertaken whilst the effects of the crisis remain at the 
forefront of individuals minds, but sufficiently distant to allow for quantitative analysis 
through a series of datasets.  The project has adopted a unique approach to the analysis of 
regional economic resilience in that it has dated the business cycle of each NUTS 2 and 
NUTS 3 territory in the ESPON space.  This provides a much stronger assessment of the 
impacts of the crisis than relying on aggregated data, or setting an artificial beginning and end 
to onset of the economic shock.   
 
Economic resilience is calculated for NUTS 2 and NUTS 3 territories across the ESPON 
space, as well as national economies.  A territory is judged to have been resilient to the crisis 
if, by 2011, it has a level of employment (or GDP) that is equal to or greater than peak levels 
achieved prior to the onset of the economic crisis.  We divide these resilient territories into 
two types: 
 those that resisted (or withstood) the crisis and experienced no decline in employment 
(or GDP) 
 those that recovered from an initial decline in employment (or GDP) 
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Territories that have not recovered to pre-crisis levels of employment (or GDP) are deemed 
not to have been resilient to the crisis.  They are also divided into two types: 
 Regions that have not recovered pre-crisis levels of employment (or GDP) but have 
recorded an upturn in employment (or GDP) and so begun the process of recovery 
 Regions that have not recovered pre-crisis levels of employment (or GDP) and are 
still recording a decline in employment (or GDP) 
 
We have chosen to use the number of persons employed in an economy as our primary 
indicator of resilience.  This reflects the importance attached to ‘having a job’ in the popular 
view of a successful economy.  It also reflects the social and health costs associated with 
employment losses.  Economic output (GDP) is a common alternative measure of economic 
performance and so we include this for comparative purposes.  Alternative measures 
considered included household incomes and the employment rate.  These have merit but also 
associated conceptual and methodological difficulties.  
 
One consideration for the study has been the extent to which macro-economic conditions 
might overwhelm otherwise resilient regions (or flatter regions that might otherwise be less 
resilient).  In order to consider this context we have developed an indicator of Relative 
Regional Resilience (R3) for NUTS 2 regions.  This provides a valuable contribution to the 
debate in that it highlights strong deviations from national performance in a small number of 
regions.   
 
Of the 280 regions considered by ECR2, more than a tenth (12%) had weathered the crisis 
and not experienced any fall in numbers employed, whilst almost a quarter (23%) had 
experienced a fall in employment but, by 2011, had recovered to the pre-crisis peak.  Two-
thirds of regions were still to recover by 2011, divided evenly between those that had passed 
the trough of the downturn, and those still to register the end of employment decline.  The 
distribution of regional economic resilience is set out in Figure ES2, which illustrates a strong 
geography of resilience, clearly influenced by national patterns.  However, important pockets 
of recovery and non-recovery are also apparent within this overall geography.  At the NUTS 
3 level similar findings occur, albeit with a slightly greater proportion of resistant regions and 
slightly fewer non-recovered but in upturn.  Localised variations in resilience are also 
apparent at smaller territorial scales in our case studies, highlighting valuable policy 
considerations.   
 
Table 5.3 Employment Resilience of NUTS 3 Territories 
Resilience Number of regions Proportion (%) 
Resistant (RS) 214 16.19 
Recovered (RC) 314 23.75 
Not recovered but in upturn 364 27.53 
Not recovered and no upturn 430 32.53 
Source: adapted from study data 
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Figure ES2 Regional Economic Resilience 
 
 
 
Figure ES3 Geographies of comparative resilience 
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Overall, around half of (NUTS 2) regions exhibit similar levels of GDP and 
employment resilience, with a third proving to have been more resilient in their 
employment performance (Figure ES3). 
 
The distribution of regional resilience between Member States suggests that 
macroeconomic conditions and national policy regimes have an influence on the 
sensitivity of individual regions to economic crisis.  Yet, there are also examples of 
where the experience of individual regions runs counter to national trends, or where 
there is strong variability within Member States.  National effects may be expected to 
be stronger in small and medium sized Member States
1
, where the influence exerted 
by national policy is proportionately greater.  However, even in small Member States, 
variation in relative levels of resilience can be observed. The relative regional 
resilience across the ESPON space is set out in Figure ES4.  Most regions exhibit a 
similar level of resilience to their national average.  However, there are some 
significant outliers, where regions either exhibit stronger resilience, compared to the 
national average, or weaker comparative resilience.   
 
Figure ES4 Relative Regional Resilience in the ESPON space 
 
                                   
1
 In small States (ie those with one NUTS2 region) the distinction between national and regional 
becomes rather artificial.    
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Comparison with the 1990s crisis supports the contention that the effects of the 
current crisis has been more strongly associated with reductions in GDP, and that the 
effects on employment have been less immediate.  In the 1990s crisis less than 5% of 
regions were resistant to the employment effects of the downturn, compared to 12% 
during the current crisis.  In contrast, almost a fifth of regions (19%) demonstrated 
GDP resistance, compared to just 5% during the most recent crisis.  Most strikingly, a 
fifth of regions (52) have never regained their peak employment levels. For four 
regions (1%), located in Germany, Italy, Portugal and the UK, recovery to peak GDP 
levels has still not been achieved. This strong hysteretic effect cautions against any 
assumption that peak levels of employment should form a natural objective following 
an economic shock, but is also suggestive of the important interplay between the 
interaction of economic shocks and longer-term processes of structural 
transformation.  We illustrate the distribution of resistant regions and those that 
demonstrate hysteretic profiles in Figure ES5. 
 
Figure ES5 Historical resilience outcomes (economic shock of early 1990s) 
 
 
The results of our quantitative and qualitative analysis suggest a range of features that 
are broadly associated with more resilient economies.  Economic structure influences 
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resilience outcomes through sectoral effects.   Overall, a dependence on sectors such 
as construction and agricultural adversely affected resilience outcomes, whilst a 
concentration of higher-order  service sector functions was beneficial.  Economic 
structure is, though, only a partial explanation of resilience.  Our qualitative 
research highlights that ownership structures, export orientation and market 
focus are all more significant.  The presence of international companies, with 
access to financial resources and greater expertise, positively assists resilience, 
as does a strong export orientation to the economy, focused on a more modern 
production techniques.  There is also a very strong positive relationship between 
higher levels of innovation performance and observed resilience outcomes.  This is 
also present for other science and technology capacity indicators (such as Human 
Resources employed in science and technology).   
 
Stronger levels of skills and experience, including managerial, tend to be associated 
with more resilient places.  Areas with more highly qualified populations tend to have 
more positive resilience outcomes.  However, simply increasing the extent of 
educational qualifications does not appear to confer greater levels of resilience, 
suggesting resilience is a long-term phenomenon, a suggestion reinforced by the 
finding that places with more stable longer-term growth patterns tended to be more 
resilient.   
 
A strong feature of several of the case studies is the significant role played by a major 
urban centre in promoting the resilience of the surrounding economy.  This is 
reinforced by quantitative results that demonstrate how the presence of an urban 
centre, particularly second-tier centres, is positively associated with resilience.  By 
contrast, regions that are remote; have external borders, or have high levels of 
population living in mountainous or coastal areas all tend to have proven less resilient 
to the economic crisis.  Further analysis of these results is required to control for 
potential uneven spatial distributions, which might bias the findings, but the greater 
challenges presented by these features is notable.  Regions with higher levels of 
accessibility also tend to be associated with more resilient outcomes.   
 
The ECR2 project sought to explore the role that community-based features could 
play in the economic resilience of the region as a whole.  What emerges are a number 
of features that appear to have some impact on observed levels of resilience.  Whilst 
rarely strong enough to impact directly on the ability of an economy to withstand the 
effects of an economic crisis they are able to play an important role in shaping the 
way in which it responds and the opportunities available to communities.  Crucial 
considerations are the strength of social networks between firms and within 
communities, which play an important role in mediating resilience outcomes.  
 
The role of community-based initiatives in countering the consequences of the 
economic downturn featured in all the cases studied.  At the very local scale the 
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development of strong localist agendas, epitomized by ‘buy-local’ campaigns formed 
one response to the crisis.  In no case were significant initiatives identified that had 
made a strong impact on the observed level of resilience within the regions 
concerned.  However, there is evidence from other locations of the role that a variety 
of long-standing initiatives, such as alternative currencies, can play in tempering the 
effects of economic downturns.  The role of such potential ‘safety-valves’ in 
supporting resilience over the longer-term merits further consideration. 
 
Across the cases studied the economic crisis has led to a renewed interest in the 
potential offered by entrepreneurship.  Several of the regions already have strong 
entrepreneurial cultures and some report that this provides a greater diversity of 
activity and enables local communities to maintain economic activity.  There is, 
though, limited evidence from the cases studied, or our wider quantitative analysis, of 
a more entrepreneurial culture making an observable difference to resilience 
experiences. 
 
Finally, the project considered the role of governance in promoting more resilient 
outcomes.  Overall, it was found that fragmented governance structures impeded 
resilience.  Resilience appears to be enhanced where public authorities work together 
with neighbouring authorities; where different levels of government work together 
towards shared objectives, and where there is a collaborative approach to working 
with economic and social partners.  Where local government has more limited 
powers, this appears to act against resilience, although the finding is not without 
exceptions.  A key consideration appears to be the extent to which sub-national 
governments have the capability to act, not just the capacity. Equally, there also has to 
be the willingness to use those powers that are available.   
 
Alongside important structural features that appear to influence levels of resilience the 
role of agency and choice also emerged as formative influences on the nature of 
response to crisis.  This manifests itself in two key dimensions: the ability to learn, 
and the ability to adapt.  Both influence the choices made, which, in turn, influences 
the resilience outcomes observed.  In several cases this was the crucial dimension in 
the ability of an economy to absorb the effects of the crisis, to reorientate activity and 
so to recover to pre-crisis employment levels.  There is evidence that a willingness, 
and capability, to adapt over both the short and the medium-term aids resilience 
outcomes.  Evidence lies in the choices made by workers and employers in making 
short-term changes to working hours and compensation arrangements during the 
duration of the crisis.  Equally, firms and economies that were able to develop new 
markets proved more able to manage the economic crisis than those that did not.  
Workers and households affected by redundancy also developed adaptive strategies, 
based on new labour market choices.  It is in these adaptive strategies that we begin to 
see the first signs of transformative effects of the crisis emerging, such as increasing 
rates of entrepreneurship.  However, in some cases the choices made appear to 
constrain adaptation.   
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Constraints on transformation was evident in the case of green economic transitions.  
There is some evidence that the crisis initially accelerated green economy ambitions 
and practices in some case study regions, particularly those where greening strategies 
were already in place, such as Wales and Puglia.  However, this has not made a 
discernable impact on their observed resilience; whether this is because the green 
economy is not yet fully-developed; is not visible in any statistics, or does not have a 
positive impact on resilience is too early to tell.  However, we also found some 
evidence that the crisis and the tighter fiscal conditions it ultimately promoted, 
significantly affected the priority afforded to greening strategies, suggesting that, in 
contrast to competitiveness and innovation, green growth is not seen as a priority at a 
time of fiscal tightening. 
 
The consistent theme emerging from our cases, and quantitative analysis, is that not 
only does each region experience the economic crisis differently but that the interplay 
of factors that influence this is also uniquely different.  Whilst the univariate and 
bivariate techniques employed by the project demonstrate strong, and relatively 
consistent, relationships between observed resilience outcomes (of both employment 
and GDP) and a number of key variables the results of multivariate techniques are 
more complex and offer poor levels of explanatory power.  It is evident that the 
interactions are complex, that the direction of influence can often reverse depending 
upon specificities of regional contexts, and that the characteristics identified only 
explain a part of the resilience observed.  It is likely that other factors are also at play, 
and that the role of policy will be a further important influence. In this context, it may 
be optimistic to assume that resilience at a regional level can be robustly modelled. 
 
Policy roles in promoting resilience are significant.  The foundations for resilient 
outcomes have been laid over a long-period of time, whilst the challenges facing non-
resilient economies are equally long-standing.  There is a clear role for policy makers 
in preparatory actions that support the development of resilience capacities and 
capabilities.  Similarly, the project has identified a series of policy-approaches that 
successfully helped stabilize regional economies in the face of the economic crisis.  
These operated at an international, national and regional scale.  Policy interventions 
were more readily mobilized where they could draw on pre-existing instruments and 
institutions.   
 
Cohesion Policies formed part of successful policy responses to promote more 
resilient economies.  They did so through sharing risks and mobilizing external fiscal 
support; through actions that helped to stabilize adverse economic pressures, and by 
helping to build absorptive, adaptive and transformational capacities.  However, in 
many cases Structural Fund programmes found it more difficult to react and respond 
to the unfolding consequences of the economic crisis. 
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Responses to the economic crisis illustrate how economies reorientate as part of a 
process of economic recovery. They also provide glimpses of transformative effects 
engendered by economic shocks. However, the constraining effects of shocks on 
transformative actions are also visible, such as evidenced by our exploration of green 
development paths, navigating this complex environment is a key policy challenge.      
 
The evidence suggests that rather than focusing on individual initiatives, resilience is 
based upon building the systemic ability of an economy to withstand, absorb and 
recover from economic shocks.  To do so does not require radical changes to existing 
policy approaches, merely a slight change in emphasis.  It does, though, require the 
concerted actions of policy actors at the European, national and sub-national scales. 
This requires the development of adaptive policies and institutions, that are able to 
evolve to meet the particularities of different shocks, rather than entrenching 
established models that lock an economy in to outmoded responses. 
 
In considering future policy directions we emphasise four principles: 
 
 Firstly, effective policy implementation requires the ability to react quickly to 
economic shocks.   
 Secondly, concerted and coordinated efforts are required to assist economies 
to recover from the crisis.   
 Thirdly, and most fundamentally, any roadmap for policy implementation 
must stress the importance of preparing for future economic shocks.   
 Fourthly, policy makers should seek to anticipate the risks of any future 
economic shock.   
 
Finally, we wish to re-emphasise the importance of place-based policy making in any 
policy roadmap.  The effects of the economic crisis have varied across and within 
places and, consequently, the place-based approach is the most appropriate means of 
building resilience over the longer-term.  The experience of the recent crisis illustrates 
the importance of seeing this as a shared responsibility between multi-level 
governance actors.  The distribution of responsibilities will vary across contexts but 
the principle is sound.   
 
Policies to develop the economic resilience of individual territories involves 
deploying available instruments in mix that responds to the particular characteristics 
of individual territories and national and international contexts.   A resilience 
orientated policy mix is place-shaped as much as being place-based.  Different 
solutions will be appropriate in different institutional contexts but enabling a multi-
layered sharing of risk across and within territories, whilst supporting the 
development of endogenous adaptive capacity is crucial for the resilience of places. 
Resilience is both a property of a complex economic system and a shared 
responsibility for those involved in managing that system. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The ESPON project Economic Crisis: Resilience of Regions (ECR2) examines the geography 
of the economic crisis across the ESPON territory, and explores why some regions are more 
able to withstand an economic downturn than others, or are able to recover faster.  The 
project began in April 2012 and culminates in Autumn 2014.  This report constitutes the 
Draft Final Report of the project. 
 
The ECR2 study resonates strongly with the territorial challenges identified for ESPON 2013 
projects.  That the current economic downturn is having an asymmetric impact on regions 
and cities is explicitly recognised as one of the seven mega-trends facing the European 
territory. What makes some regions more resilient in the face of economic crises, and others 
less so, is a question that has strong relevance in the present economic circumstances.  
1.1 Project objectives and structure 
The objective of the project is: 
 
“To expose territorial evidence that supports policy-makers at different administrative 
levels in making the economic structure(s) in Europe and its countries, regions and cities 
more resilient to economic crises and a sudden economic downturn.” 
 
In doing so, the project was asked to deepen our understanding of: 
 
 The impact of the current economic crisis and other recent crises such as the one in 
the early 1990s; 
 The resilience of economic structures; 
 The capacity (of regions and territories) to adapt to new socio-economic realities. 
 
The project was also provided with a number of associated policy questions and research 
questions, that form the foundations for the work undertaken.  These were: 
 
1. To identify the territorial impact of the last economic crisis: 
 To identify indicators which present a robust measure of the territorial impact of the 
economic crisis.  
 To measure the territorial impact of the economic crisis at different geographical 
scales, to identify and map the distribution of these impacts across the European 
territory and to identify whether specific types of region have been more affected than 
others. 
 To identify whether particular economic activities/sectors were particularly impacted 
by the economic crisis, and the location of these effects 
 To identify the spatial and temporal distribution of the territorial impact of economic 
crises across the European territory. 
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2. To estimate the territorial resilience of regions: 
 To identify what elements in economic structures and policy responses made a 
difference to regions’ ability to recover from the economic crisis. 
 To identify the qualitative and quantitative factors which form territorial 
characteristics enabling some regions to resist, or move out of, economic downturn 
more effectively than others. 
 To identify which regions and which types of territories tend to be more resilient and 
adaptive to economic crises in Europe. 
 
3. To understand the role of territorial policy responses in promoting economic resilience: 
 To identify the potential role that territorial development policies can play, and are 
playing, in promoting regional resilience and economic recovery. 
 To estimate the contribution that integrated and place-based actions can play in 
complementing macro-economic measures aimed at stimulating economic recovery. 
 To consider how policy-makers can enhance the resilience of regional economies for 
future economic downturn. 
 
The draft final report seeks to address each of these key themes in turn.  Section 3 briefly 
introduces the adopted methodology and Section 2 provides a short consideration of the 
concept of economic resilience in the face of economic shocks.  Section 4 focuses on the 
territorial impact of the current economic crisis, particularly on the spatial and temporal 
effects. Section 5 builds on this work, and explores which regions have proved to be resilient 
to the crisis, and which have not.  Consideration is also given to how territories responded to 
past crises, namely that of the early 1990s.  Section 6 considers those factors and 
characteristics that appear to influence the observed resilience of regions across the ESPON 
space based on the results of the quantitative and qualitative research undertaken by the 
project.  In Section 7 the report draws on the findings of the research to consider the role of 
policy in promoting resilient economies.  The report provides conclusions and summary 
recommendations in Section 8. 
 
1.2 Regional Resilience 
Regional Resilience is defined in terms of economic resilience – this does not underplay other 
forms of territorial resilience (to natural disasters or other hazards for example) but acts as the 
focus for this study. For definitional purposes it is defined in terms of a regional economy’s 
ability to withstand or overcome a recessionary event in the wider economy. Extending from 
this, our working definition of resilience for this project is:  
 
The ability of a regional economy to withstand, absorb or overcome an internal or 
external economic shock. 
 
We capture resilience to economic shocks both in terms of the response of economic output 
(as measured by levels of total GDP) and employment (measured as total number of persons 
3 
ESPON ECR2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
employed
2
).  Other measures that were considered include number of persons unemployed 
(or rate of unemployment) and levels of household income.  Both have their advantages in 
terms of conceptions of what constitutes resilience but were discounted for methodological 
reasons and based on wider discussions as to key policy concerns.  In practice we have 
favoured the use of employment as an indicator of resilience, both because it is subject to 
fewer revisions over time than measures of GDP and because it resonates with the wider 
public, who tend to be concerned about the ability of an economy to support employment. 
For the purposes of this work we consider economic resilience at both the NUTS 2 and 
NUTS 3 territorial scales. 
 
A full explanation of the methodology for calculating the observed resilience of regions to an 
economic shock is given in Section 2.  Our approach identifies four categories of resilience: 
 
 Resistant regions (RS) – those regions that have not experienced an absolute decline 
in economic activity following the economic shock. 
 Recovered regions (RC) – those regions that experienced a decline in economic 
activity, but have since recovered to pre-shock activity levels. 
 Not-recovered, but in upturn (NR1) – those regions that experienced a decline in 
economic activity, have passed the trough of the recession, but have not yet recovered 
to pre-shock activity levels 
 Not-recovered, still in decline (NR2) – those regions that experienced a decline in 
economic activity, which was still ongoing at the time of the analysis. 
 
It is worth noting that resilience to an economic shock does not necessarily imply that the 
economy is otherwise strong and performing well over the longer-term.  It is a measure of 
how the economy responded to a particular economic shock.  Resilience may thus differ from 
economic growth.  Equally, regions that experience a very tight labour market prior to a 
shock may appear to be less resilient (owing to the difficulty of returning to artificially high 
employment rates).  Furthermore, there may be a trade-off between resilience in the short-
term and over the longer-run.  These are considerations that are dealt with later in the report.   
2 Method and approach 
 
The study has employed a mixed methods approach that has combined quantitative data 
analysis with qualitative fieldwork.  The key methodological stages have been: 
 
 A review of existing literature concerning the definition of resilience, its component 
features and ways of measuring this 
 The collation of datasets through which to assess the resilience of regions in practice 
 The analysis of these datasets to assess the factors that might influence observed 
levels of resilience 
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 As part of the analysis we also consider total number of jobs in the economy concerned. 
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 The synthesis of data sources to assess the impact of the most recent economic crisis 
 Mapping of key findings 
 The completion of eight case studies to examine the effect of the crisis in practice 
 
1.1 Quantitative approach  
The primary data sources utilized have been provided by Experian plc, based on their 
European Regional Forecasting Service, and by Cambridge Econometrics, from their 
European Regional Database.  Collectively these provide data across 24 indicators at various 
territorial scales.  These have been supplemented with additional data drawn from Eurostat, 
other ESPON studies and composite indicators from sources such as the European Innovation 
Scoreboard.  The principal indicators used have been employment and GDP at the NUTS 2 
and NUTS 3 territorial scale.  These form the basis for the calculation of regional economic 
resilience, and for the identification of when economic shocks occur.   
 
National and regional economies are in continuous flux, as they expand and contract in 
response to events.  Since 1990 there has only been one year where all regional economies in 
the ESPON space were experiencing growth (Figure 2.1).  Differentiating between localized 
shocks and those that are more widespread is necessary in order to undertake comparative 
analysis.  From the data it is apparent that there are two European-wide downturns within the 
period 1990-2007, prior to the most recent economic crisis.  One occurs in the period 1992-
93 and the other, smaller, event occurs around 2002-2003. 
 
Figure 2.1 Annual incidence of employment and GDP decline at a regional level (1990-
2006) 
 
Source: adapted from study data (n=280) 
 
To date these shocks, and to identify associated regional resilience outcomes, the project has 
applied a de-trending filter to annual time-series data for GDP and employment from the late 
1980s to 2011
3
. This has enabled the project to identify peaks and troughs in the cycle of 
economic activity for each NUTS 2 and NUTS 3 region.  We have used this business-cycle 
perspective to date the onset of economic downturn in each region of the ESPON space, the 
date the downturn ends and the date at which activity recovers to pre-shock peak levels.  The 
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 This is the latest date for which data is available at March 2014. 
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approach builds on our definition of the various stages of an economy’s response to a major 
economic shock (as set out in Figure 2.2).  Where an economy is resistant to a shock, there is 
no downturn in activity.  This enables the project to identify the dates of Europe-wide 
economic shocks and to identify which regions were resilient to a shock (categories RS and 
RC) and those that were not (categories NR1 and NR2).   
 
Figure 2.2 Modelling resilience 
 
In this model, recovery occurs at point C1, when employment (or output) regains its pre-
shock peak level (P1).  The time taken to recover is given by D1 + D2; whilst the duration of 
the whole business cycle is given by D.  We have taken the year of 2011 as the cut-off date 
for recovery to have occurred in order for a region to be considered resilient to the most 
recent economic shock. 
 
Following the identification of which regions were resilient in the face of the last economic 
crisis, and those that were not, the project has applied different quantitative techniques, 
focused on bivariate and multivariate analysis, to assess the significance of various territorial 
characteristics for resilience.  Using a Business, People, Place and Community categorisation 
the results of this inform our reporting on the features that influence resilience outcomes. 
 
1.2 Qualitative approach 
The project complements the quantitative assessment of regional economic resilience with a 
qualitative analysis focused on eight case studies of regional experience during the past crisis.  
The eight cases were selected at the outset of the project on the basis of including a selection 
of diverse examples, including geographical situation; economic context; economic 
performance through the crisis, and governance context.  Some cases were also requested in 
the Terms of Reference for the project.  Two cases were included in order to meet the request 
to consider what role the development of green economic paradigms might be having on the 
resilience of regions to economic shocks.  The project deliberately included cases that cover 
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different territorial scales, where possible each case was considered in the context of the 
NUTS 2 and NUTS 3 territories, but also considered smaller territorial scales where this was 
appropriate to context.  In one case, Wales, a NUTS 1 scale was selected owing to the 
governance and administrative structures present.   
 
The cases selected were: 
 
 Pomorskie, Poland 
 Uusimaa, Finland 
 Stuttgart, Germany 
 Wales, UK 
 Puglia, Italy 
 Western Macedonia, Greece 
 South West Ireland, Ireland 
 Estonia, Estonia 
 
Each study was conducted to a common format, which included the collation of locally-
relevant data-sets and semi-structured interviews with representatives of local businesses, 
government and civic society.  A workshop, or seminar, was also held in each region to gain 
insights from a wider range of actors.  Each case includes: a description of the experience of 
the territory through the most recent crisis; an assessment of the characteristics of the territory 
that have contributed to the observed outcomes (following the Business, People, Place and 
Community categorization adopted for the quantitative analysis); a description of the policy 
responses to the crisis, and an assessment of the role policy and governance has played in the 
observed outcomes.  The case studies also consider responses to previous crises in the 
territory since the 1990s; how these may have influenced the present situation, and what 
lessons might be learnt.  In addition, each case study also included a consideration of the role 
of the Structural Funds in responding to the crisis, and how the crisis had affected Structural 
Fund programmes. 
3 Concepts of resilience and crisis4 
3.1 Economic shocks and crisis 
Economies are continuously in a state of flux, caused by the interplay of decisions taken by a 
complex web of individuals, firms, public agencies and other organisations connected 
through a complex transactional web.  Occasionally, the existing pathways of transactional 
connections of production and consumption are interrupted, with consequences at the 
individual, local, regional, national or even international level.  For the purposes of this work 
we consider an economic shock to arise where the interruption occurs through shifts in the 
economic structures of the economy, rather than through a natural event such as an 
earthquake, although the latter may also have economic consequences, and the effects can be 
transmitted to more distant places in the form of an economic shock. 
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Economic shocks are not particularly rare events and their likely occurrence can be broadly 
foreseen.  The consequences of these shocks are much less predictable (Taleb, 2010), as 
witnessed by the rapid unravelling of the economic order following defaults in the American 
sub-prime mortgage market.  It is the consequences of an event that tends to mark it out as a 
‘shock’ to the system and, certainly, to attach the word ‘crisis’.  Analysing crises is not an 
easy topic, because crises are by definition confusing and contested phenomena, which 
challenge existing ways of doing and understanding.  Crises can disrupt existing institutions 
and cause uncertainty about future directions, which offers opportunities for substantial 
change that deviates from locked-in trajectories. Whether or not these opportunities are taken 
depends on how (causes and solutions) of crises are interpreted in different places and 
contexts. 
3.2 What is resilience? 
Resilience has become one of the leading ideas of our time for dealing with uncertainty and 
change and is a concept which is increasingly being utilised by authors keen to understand 
how local and regional economies deal with economic shocks and recessionary crises (e.g. 
Pendall et al, 2010; Hill et al, 2011).  
 
Within the developing literature on regional economic resilience, a broad distinction can be 
made between two different conceptions of the term (Pendall et al, 2010). The first focuses 
on the resistance of a system to shocks and the speed of its return or ‘bounce-back’ to a pre-
shock state or equilibrium. The faster the system returns to equilibrium, the more resilient it 
is (Holling, 1996). The second definition is based on an adaptive notion of resilience which 
views the economic landscape as a complex adaptive system which is always dynamic and 
does not adjust towards any notion of equilibrium (Martin and Sunley, 2006; 2007). Instead, 
resilience is defined as the adaptive capacity of a local or regional economic system or ‘the 
ability of the region’s industrial technological, labour force and institutional structures to 
adapt to the changing competitive, technological and market pressures and opportunities that 
confront its firms and workforce’ (Simmie and Martin, 2010; p. 30). Regional economic 
resilience from this perspective is conceived as a multi-dimensional property embracing not 
only recovery from the shock and resistance (the ability of regions to resist disruptive shocks 
in the first place), but also re-orientation (the extent to which the region adapts its economic 
structure), and finally, renewal (the degree to which the region resumes the growth path that 
characterised its economy prior to the shock) (Martin, 2012). 
 
Studies from this perspective have highlighted the adaptive cycles of growth and decline, 
stability and change which may characterise regional economic systems (Martin and Sunley, 
2010). As such, crises may often provoke or encourage the transformation of systems and the 
development of new, related or alternative trajectories or niches (Pike et al, 2010). 
Furthermore these system dynamics are path-dependent and critically shaped by past events 
and evolutionary histories. Shocks can thus have both temporary and lasting ‘hysteretic’ 
impacts on system functioning (Martin, 2012).  
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The existing literature also highlights the normative and political dimensions of resilience. A 
number of questions remain to be addressed about the intended state of recovery after a 
shock, or the required adaptations in regional economies or indeed when relevant crises and 
transformations can be considered to be over (Hudson, 2010). Rohring and Gailing (2010) 
observe that ‘resilience’ goals are the subject of social construction through regional 
discourses and forms of governance. Hill et al (2011) also conclude that regional economic 
resilience ‘inevitably has a subjective component’ and use an example to illustrate that the 
perceptions of leaders in a region about a region’s resilience may differ from measured 
economic performance. This serves to highlight the importance of combining quantitative and 
qualitative data on resilience and points to further questions around whether resilience is 
always a good thing. A resilient regional economy may be undesirable if it is characterised by 
unsustainable growth or behaviour, widespread inequality or excessive economic 
fluctuations, or social ills associated with continual upheaval and change.  
3.2 What helps build or shape resilience? 
Alongside the burgeoning literature on the meaning of resilience, there is a developing body 
of work on the factors shaping it. To date, this literature has primarily focused on factors 
pertinent to the structural features of regional economies and the agency of businesses or 
firms. Much less emphasis has been placed upon understanding issues around the agency of 
other (notably policy) actors in the system. What the existing literature also highlights is that 
there are no ‘magic bullets’ that both insulate regions from the harmful impacts of economic 
downturns and help them recover quickly. No regional characteristics or public policies do 
everything that one might like (Hill et al, 2011). 
 
3.2.1 Structural factors – inherent or innate components of resilience 
The structural factors shaping resilience might usefully be labelled as the ‘inherent’ 
components of resilience in social systems i.e. the factors which shape innate capacities to 
react, or the autonomous responses to shocks (Rose, 2004). These include the initial strengths 
and weaknesses of regions, their industrial legacy, the size of the market, access to a larger 
external market, as well as endowments in natural resources and in physical and human 
capital (Davies et al, 2010). A common finding in this literature is that regions with higher 
incomes or wages (independent of human capital) tend to recover more quickly from 
economic shocks (see Hill et al, 2011). 
 
Another critical structural dimension appears to be the sectoral structure of regions. In 
general terms, a region’s vulnerability to adverse economic shocks is correlated with its 
sectoral specialisation (Davies et al, 2010). Studies suggest that regions which specialise in a 
narrow range of sectors are particularly vulnerable to sectoral shocks and run the risk of 
suffering permanent reductions in the numbers of firms and jobs (Davies et al, 2010) – or 
negative hysteretic effects (after Martin, 2012). A more diverse economic structure provides 
greater regional resistance to shocks than does a more specialised structure since risk is 
effectively spread across a region’s business portfolio, although a high degree of sectoral 
interrelatedness may limit this (Dawley et al, 2010; Martin, 2012). This creates an imperative 
to understand existing regional competencies and specialisms and how they may renew or 
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atrophy, as well as the appropriate degrees of ‘related’ and ‘unrelated variety’ (Frenken and 
Boschma, 2007). 
 
Some evidence points to the different effects of some innate regional characteristics on 
different aspects of resilience. For example, Hill et al’s (2011) analysis of the resilience of 
US regions demonstrates that a poorly educated population makes a region more likely to 
suffer from an employment downturn but makes it easier for the region to recover. Similarly, 
a high degree of existing income inequality makes a region’s income more resilient to 
economic shocks, but undermines the recovery of employment levels.  
 
3.2.2 Adaptive capacities – purposeful action and agency 
Whilst providing some very valuable insights, these perspectives on regional economic 
resilience to date have not paid as much attention to the agency of actors in the system and 
how they might shape resilience capacities and emergent outcomes.  
If we take a complex adaptive systems perspective, then regional economies are understood 
to be characterised by an adaptive capacity, the dynamics of which are driven from the 
bottom up and by individual actors throughout the system. In social systems, agents have the 
capacity to react to crisis situations in positive ways. It is of course also possible that the 
actions (or inactions) of agents might result in less positive adaptation and weakening 
resilience over time. In short, if resilience is defined in terms of an evolutionary, complex 
adaptive systems approach, it must pay greater attention to human agency and embrace a 
people-oriented as well as a system-oriented perspective (Bohle et al, 2009). Clearly 
quantitative work on regional economic performance can provide descriptive results about 
the frequency of shocks and those regions which are shock-resistant and resilient. However, it 
is much less effective at illuminating ‘the processes through which regional actors protected 
their regions from or responded to downturns caused by economic shocks’ which remain a 
‘black box’ requiring interrogation through more qualitative, case study work (Hill et al, 
2011; p. 61). 
 
Policy leaders in particular may take purposive action towards innovative restructuring in a 
manner which ‘improves the chance for a healthy region in the long run’ (Cowell, 2013; p. 
213). Several studies have indeed highlighted the potential for targeted investment policies 
and long-term territorial development strategies at the metropolitan and regional scale to 
enhance adaptation to new socio-economic realities (e.g. LSE Cities, 2010; Hervas-Oliver et 
al, 2011). Citizens and civil society more generally are also increasingly understood to play a 
key role in finding innovative solutions to key development challenges and to helping build 
community and place resilience through social innovation. This reflects their capacity to tap 
into decentralised sources of knowledge and capability using an approach that mobilises not 
just large corporations and nations, but a wide and diverse ecology of citizens and global 
organisations (see, for example, McCarthy, 2010; also Magis, 2010).  
 
Individual firms, business leaders and entrepreneurs also play a key role in effecting the 
sectoral shifts and diversification noted as important above, but also as collective agents of 
purposive adaptation through conscious entrepreneurial decisions or by acting as conduits for 
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technological or product innovation (Simmie and Martin , 2010). Other analyses suggest 
regional resilience depends upon the existence of a large number of innovative and well-
networked small firms with embedded regional capacities (Clark et al, 2010), whilst others 
emphasise the role of particular ‘pivotal’ firms in clusters which act as hubs in the innovation 
process (Kechidi and Talbot, 2010).  Recent work has also suggested there is much to be 
gained from firms combining external sources of knowledge accessed through so called 
‘global pipelines’ with the ‘local buzz’ (and vibrancy) that exists within their own 
geographical region (see Storper and Venables 2004, cited in Hervas-Oliver et al, 2011).  
 
Much of the pertinent literature here indicates that critical to shaping behaviour, particularly 
positive anticipatory behaviour by all key agents in the economy, is learning (Folke et al, 
2003). What particularly distinguishes economic and human systems from biological ones, is 
the role played by learning, adaptive management and the deliberate acquisition of 
knowledge. Systems with scope for embracing diverse perspectives, more novel ideas and 
‘exuberant experimentalism’ are more likely to find creative solutions to crises (Bateson, 
2000). As such, places with highly open networks for learning and knowledge exchange 
across business, sectors, citizens and institutions have been posited as more likely to display 
resilience (CLES, 2010; Bristow, 2010).  
 
These literatures also suggest that critical to shaping these behaviours or micro-level rules is 
context. The contingency of context (e.g. through cultural norms) shapes adaptive behaviours 
such as business expectations and entrepreneurship / innovation, consumer confidence, labour 
market flexibility, migration tendencies and so on, and thus shapes how they emerge to effect 
regional resilience. Regions are shapers and not simply containers of economic agents and 
their activities. As well as cultural and social context, physical location and neighbours 
matter too (Hill et al, 2008). Helping to understand how context shapes regional economic 
resilience is thus an important element of this research.   
4 Territorial Impact of the Economic Crisis 
 
The economic crisis did not affect all parts of the ESPON territory evenly.  Some areas 
entered the economic downturn earlier, others later.  Some have experienced a sharper 
downturn and others a more prolonged crisis.  Analysis by Cambridge Econometrics (Figure 
4.1) highlights that following a period of uniform growth in the early years of the century, the 
period since the crisis has shown a marked divergence in performance, with only 6 Member 
States achieving pre-crisis growth rates (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Poland, Slovakia and 
Sweden).   
4.1 Spatial and temporal geography of the crisis 
Although Cambridge Econometrics dates the crisis from 2008, isolated regions in Romania, 
Germany and the UK all experienced decline in the numbers employed in 2006, and the first 
signs of the emerging territorial impact of the unfolding economic crisis emerge in 2007, with 
declining employment numbers recorded in regions in both these countries plus the UK, 
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Germany, Austria, Bulgaria and Portugal (Figure 4.2).  It was national economies that entered 
recession in 2008. During 2008 the crisis gathered pace with regions in 13 Member States 
experiencing falling levels of employment.   
Figure 4.1 GDP change in EU economies 
 
Source: Reproduced by permission of Cambridge Econometrics (2013). 
  
By 2009, the effects of the economic crisis were apparent across most of the ESPON 
territory. At a national level Poland and Switzerland were the only States that had not 
experienced a fall in levels of GDP output and only Poland, Switzerland, Germany, 
Luxembourg and Belgium managed to retain pre-crisis employment levels.  At a regional 
level, nearly all regions in the ESPON territory outside of Poland had experienced a 
downturn in GDP, with only slightly fewer also experiencing a decline in employment 
numbers.  The first signs of recovery begin to be seen in 2010.  The stronger performance of 
Malta, Germany and Southern France is evident in Figure 4.2, together with regions in 
Belgium, Luxembourg and, in isolated examples, the UK, Portugal and the Netherlands, with 
progress continuing to be visible in 2011. 
4.2 Scale of the crisis 
The decline in employment associated with the economic crisis has been extensive.  Across 
the ESPON area (ESPON 31) total employment fell by 2.14% by 2011, with the EU15 
experiencing a similar decline (Table 4.1).  The experience of the Member States that have 
joined the EU post 2004 is somewhat worse, with an average fall in employment of 2.22%, 
despite the better performance of the Polish economy.  This is dwarfed though by the 
difficulties evident in the Member States that sought assistance from the European Financial 
Stability Fund, where employment levels have fallen by almost a tenth.  Membership of the 
Euro currency unit (the ‘Eurozone’) has been associated with a slightly stronger fall in 
employment than for non-euro States. 
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Figure 4.2 Temporal spread of economic crisis (2006-2011) 
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Table 4.1 Employment decline across territorial groupings (%, peak year to 
2011) 
 
ESPON 
31 EU27 EU15 EU12 Eurozone 
Non-
Eurozone EFSF 
% employment loss -2.14 -2.22 -2.14 -2.55 -2.27 -2.11 -9.47 
Source: own calculations.  EU27 is used as Croatia was not a member of the EU until 2013.   
 
The severity of the crisis has varied within the ESPON territory, with some regions 
being affected more strongly than others.  Figure 4.3 illustrates the proportionate fall 
in employment in each region.  Whilst employment levels fell by less than 5% in most 
regions, a small number of regions have been affected much more adversely.  The 
most extreme case is Latvia, which has recorded a total fall in the number of persons 
employed that is approaching a quarter of the numbers employed at the peak of the 
boom.  The distribution of employment changes across regions is non-linear and takes 
a logarithmic form, suggesting that there is a strong reinforcement mechanism at 
work.  The spatial distribution of employment loss is illustrated in Figure 4.4, 
highlighting a strong peripheral geography to the most severe employment losses. 
 
Figure 4.3 Employment decline by region (%, peak year to 2011) 
 
Source: adapted from study data 
4.3 Intra-national variation 
The effects of the crisis are not necessarily evenly distributed within countries, 
although this can be the case.  Figure 4.5 illustrates the distributional impact of the 
crisis within countries as indicated by the spread of employment losses between those 
regions most heavily affected within each country and those least affected.  The 
median point within each country is indicated by the bar.  We have excluded single 
region countries but included all countries containing more than one NUTS 2 region.   
 
Whilst countries like Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland and Sweden all exhibit a 
relatively small range in terms of the recorded employment impact of the crisis, a 
much wider range of experience is visible in countries such as Spain, Bulgaria and 
Poland.  Whilst the differential between regions might be expected to be less in small 
two-region economies this is not always the case.   
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Figure 4.4 Employment loss during the crisis (NUTS 2) 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5 Impact of the crisis within ESPON states 
 
Source: Study calculations 
 
4.4 Wider dimensions to the crisis 
4.4.1 Rising unemployment, and widening disparities 
Amongst the headline effects of the crisis have rising levels of unemployment. An 
initial reduction in unemployment rates across the EU in 2010 proved shortlived as 
15 
ESPON ECR2 DRAFT FINAL REPORT 
the developing fiscal crisis led to a further rise in recorded levels, with the median 
rate of registered unemployment reaching 8% in 2011.   The first signs of a fall in 
unemployment have begun to emerge in 2013.   Whilst unemployment rates have 
generally risen, actual rates of unemployment remained low (below 4%) in 17% of 
regions even at the height of the crisis (Table 4.2). 
 
Within countries, there has been a reduction in the range of unemployment disparities 
in a small number of countries (Austria, Germany, Finland, the Netherlands and the 
Czech Republic) and they have remained the same in others (Belgium, Denmark, 
Poland and Slovenia).  However, this is outweighed by the larger number of countries 
where disparities have risen between 2007-11 (Table 4.3).   
 
Table 4.2 Regional rates of unemployment (2007 and 2011, NUTS 2) 
Unemployment rate (%) Number of Regions (2007) Number of Regions (2011) 
0-4 75 48 
5-9 158 134 
10-19 53 93 
20-30 1 14 
Source: adapted from Experian study data 
 
The highest rises have been in Norway, Switzerland and Ireland, all countries where 
disparities did not previously exist (and so disproportionately represented by the 
calculation).  Table 4.3 illustrates that the reduction in disparities has relied on peak 
rates of unemployment
5
 falling (or remaining the same) rather than faster rising rates 
of unemployment in better performing regions.  Only in the Czech Republic has this 
latter case been evident. 
 
Table 4.3 Change in peak regional unemployment and disparities within states 
(2007-11) 
 Lower peak 
unemployment 
No Change Higher peak 
unemployment 
Widening disparities   FR, EL, IE, HU, IT, 
ES, SE, SK, PT, UK, 
BU, RO, NO, HR, CH 
No change  BE, PL 
 
SL, DK 
Narrowing disparities AT, DE, FI 
 
NL CZ 
 
One of the real impacts of the crisis has been the dramatically rising level of youth 
unemployment, particularly, but not only, in Spain, Portugal and Greece (European 
Commission, 2013).  Concentrations of youth unemployment are visible across much 
                                   
5
 This refers to the highest regional rate of unemployment within a country compared across the two 
years considered. 
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of the EU, outside of the core heartlands of Germany, Austria and the Netherlands.  
Rates of youth unemployment are particularly affected by labour market 
opportunities, but also by labour market policies and practices, which can 
preferentially protect older workers at the expense of younger workers on more 
flexible contracts. 
 
4.4.2 Employment losses in construction, primary industries and manufacturing 
industry 
Although total employment in the ESPON space has fallen during the crisis (by 
around 2%), this is not evenly distributed across sectors (Figure 4.6).  Employment in 
sectors which have experienced job losses during the period of the crisis peaked in 
2008, which has informed our choice of dates for the following analysis.  Across the 
ESPON space, job losses during the crisis have been concentrated in the construction 
sector (NACE F) and the real estate sector (NACE L), reflecting the significance of 
the collapse in the property ‘bubble’ at the outset of the crisis.  Other sectors that were 
badly affected included manufacturing industries (NACE B-E) and primary industries 
(NACE A).  The number of persons employed in ICT (NACE J), Professional, 
scientific and technical services (NACE M-N) and Arts, entertainment, recreation and 
other services (NACE R-U) increased over this period; with public sector 
employment sectors (NACE O- Q) also registering a slight increase. 
 
Figure 4.6 Employment losses by sector (NACE2, 2008-11) 
   
Source: Adapted from CE study data 
 
Experience across the ESPON space varies.  Whilst industrial sectors (NACE B-E) 
recorded employment losses across all countries, all other sectors experienced growth 
in at least one country).  Equally, although five sectors recorded employment gains 
across the ESPON space, all recorded losses in particular countries.  The significance 
of employment falls for some sectors in particular countries is evident for both the 
construction sector (NACE F) and Real Estate activities (NACE L).  Mean 
employment change for the sector is represented by the bar (Figure 4.7). 
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4.4.3 Fall and rise of trade, exports and inward investment 
One immediate impact of the crisis was falling levels of credit availability as banks 
faced a crisis of liquidity and confidence.  This affected private firms who were 
unable to access credit terms or investment finance.  This, together with falling levels 
of confidence, led to reducing level of trade and falling volumes of inward 
investment. The decline in inward investment flows occurred both within the EU and 
from sources outside the EU.  The gradually recovery of inward investment flows 
from within the EU from 2009 and from external locations from 2010 highlights the 
recovery of the global economy. However, levels of domestic demand for products in 
the EU remain depressed, reflecting the tight economic conditions of EU markets in 
the face of austerity policies and high levels of household debt in many countries. 
 
Figure 4.7 Variations in sectoral employment change across countries (Max-Min 
by country, %) 
 
Note: omits outlier of 60% increase in Real Estate (L) employment in Bulgaria.  
Source: Adapted from CE study data 
 
4.4.4 Increasing indebtness overall, but some exceptions 
Across the EU, the gradual decline in household debt as a proportion of income 
during the economic boom came to an abrupt halt as household incomes fell and their 
debts rose (Figure 4.8).   
 
The aggregate figure for the EU hides some strong differences between countries 
(Figure 4.9). In four Member States levels of personal debt, relative to household 
income, have generally declined over the period of the crisis, although this is the 
exception.  In most Member States, the debt:income ratio rose.  It did so sharply, from 
comparatively low ratios, in the case of the Baltic Member States, before falling back.  
In three Member States, debt:income ratios continue to rise, whilst in a further two 
levels have only recently started to decline.   
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Figure 4.8 Ratio of gross household debt to income (EU28) 
 
Source: adapted from Eurostat (nasa_ki) 
  
The general trend of increasing indebtedness during the crisis, is mirrored by a trend 
of rising general government debt. By 2012, the ratio of Government debt to GDP had 
reached almost 160% in Greece.  In contrast, in Estonia, also badly affected by the 
economic crisis, Government debt was just 10% of GDP.  In two States (Sweden and 
Norway) there has been a noticeable decline in debt levels over the period of the 
crisis, whilst in other states, levels of Government debt are beginning to fall after 
rising during the crisis itself.  Debt levels in Portugal, Greece, Ireland and Cyprus 
strongly increased between 2009-12. 
 
4.4.5 Falling wages, reduced working hours and rising levels of low work 
households 
The crisis has been marked by a slight rise in the proportion of people living in 
households with very low work intensity, where adults worked less than 20% of their 
total work potential.  Significant increases in low work intensity households were 
recorded in Iceland, Lithuania, Spain, Latvia and other economies badly hit by the 
crisis.  In contrast, reductions in the proportion of the population living in low work 
intensity households can be seen in Germany Poland and Austria, as well as the Czech 
Republic and Austria. In 2012, the top five countries in terms of the proportion of 
their population living in low work households were: Ireland (24.2%
6
), Croatia 
(16.2%), Spain (14.3%), Greece (14.2%), Belgium (14.1%) and the UK (13%). 
 
Overall, the crisis has also been marked by a slight increase in the number of hours 
worked (by 1% between 2005 and 2011).  There is though a strong disparity in 
experience across the ESPON space, with the fall in the number of hours worked in 
12 of the worst affected economies matched by a rise in hours in 14 economies. 
                                   
6
 In 2011, no data available for Ireland for 2012. 
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Figure 4.9 Patterns of household debt:income ratio during the crisis (Source: adapted from Eurostat (nasa_ki) 
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4.4.6 Rising household incomes, but mixed messages for proportion of population 
at risk of poverty 
Across the ESPON space average disposable household incomes have risen by around 
12% between 2005 and 2012.  However, examining the period between the pre-crisis 
peak (2008) and 2012 the rise is around 6%.  During this period household disposable 
incomes have fallen in eight countries, with significant falls recorded in Greece, 
Ireland, Romania, Latvia, Spain and Hungary (Figure 4.10).  In Ireland and Greece 
household disposable incomes were lower than was the case in 2005, the only two 
economies where this was so in the ESPON space.  The principle increases in 
household disposable income was to be found in Switzerland, Norway and Sweden. 
 
Figure 4.10 Change in total household disposable income (2008-12, %) 
 
Source: Adapted from Eurostat (nasa_nf_tr) 
 
One possible consequence of the economic crisis is an increase in the proportion of 
the population at risk of poverty.  The ESPON TiPSE project suggests that this is 
concentrated in southern Europe, but with important ‘hotspots’ identifiable elsewhere.  
Drawing on material from Eurostat, TiPSE identifies the significance of national 
welfare regimes as a mediator of the extent to which national populations are exposed 
to the risk of poverty. 
 
4.4.7 Changing migration patterns 
Overall there has been a reduction in levels of migration across the ESPON space, as 
labour markets tightened and changing economic circumstances reduced the 
attractiveness of late-career migration.  According to the ESPON ATTREG project, 
many of the regions most affected by the crisis continue to experience net in-
migration.  The net migration figures available at a regional level, are not able to 
distinguish local effects, such as those highlighted in some of the case studies for this 
work, nor the reported out-migration of young adults from Spain, Ireland and other 
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struggling economies in search of work in the more vibrant economies of countries 
such as Germany and, more often, globally. 
 
4.4.8 Negative perceptions of the future 
One of the under-reported elements of the economic crisis is individuals’ perceptions 
of the economic climate they face.  These perceptions can have an important influence 
on individual and household consumption patterns, as people make decisions on what 
they anticipate the duration and severity of an economic downturn may be.  
Qualitative data can also provide insights into the effects of the crisis on the incomes 
available to households. 
 
In 2009 residents of the Baltic States were feeling least secure in their employment 
prospects, by 2011 this had changed to residents of Greece and Cyprus, with residents 
of Slovakia persisting in their feelings of insecurity (Figure 4.11). 
 
Figure 4.11 Proportion of respondents Not At All or Not Very Confident in their 
ability to keep their job (%) 
 
Source: adapted from Eurobarometer Flash EB no 286 (2010) and Flash EB no 338 (2012) Fieldwork 
in 2009 and 2011 respectively 
 
In terms of the effect that the economic crisis is having on different parts of the EU, a 
survey undertaken in 2010 gives a very strong indication of the varying territorial 
impact.  When asked whether the crisis was having a major impact or no impact, more 
than 80% of respondents in Hungary, Romania and Greece felt that it was having an 
important impact.   In contrast, respondents in Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Austria, 
Finland, Netherlands and Luxembourg were most likely to feel that the crisis was 
having no impact on their personal situation. 
 
Looking forwards from the 2012, most citizens of the EU believed the worst of the 
crisis remained ahead of them.  This was particularly the case in Spain, Greece, 
Portugal and Cyprus, but also includes citizens of Sweden, Belgium and Luxembourg 
(Figure 4.12).  Only in seven countries did most citizens believe that the worst is now 
past, and even here it was, on the whole, a fairly slim majority. 
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Figure 4.12 Proportion of residents who believe worst of crisis is still to come (%) 
 
Source: adapted from Standard Eurobarometer 78 (2012 Autumn) 
5 Economic Resilience of Regions 
 
Economic resilience is defined as the ability of a region to avoid a fall in economic 
activity or to regain pre-crisis (or pre-shock) peak levels of employment or GDP.  We 
include two categories of resilient territories: those that resisted the crisis (RS) and 
those that recovered from the crisis (RC).  We also include two categories of regions 
that were not resilient to the crisis: those that have begun their recovery, but where 
employment (or GDP) has not yet returned to pre-shock levels (NR1) and those that 
remain in decline (NR2). 
5.1 National economic resilience 
Across the ESPON territory four countries, Luxembourg, Germany, Switzerland and 
Poland, have resisted the economic crisis and maintained, or increased, levels of 
employment in the period of the recent crisis.  Only Poland also managed to maintain 
or increase its level of GDP.  By 2011, eight countries had recovered to their pre-
crisis peak of GDP activity, and five to their pre-crisis level of employment.  
 
Table 5.1 National patterns of resilience to the current economic crisis 
 Employment measure GDP measure 
Resisted LU, DE, CH, PL PL 
Recovered NO, SE, MT, AT, BE DE, NO, SE, CH, AT, FR, 
MT, SK 
Not Recovered: upturn IS, UK, FR, NL, IT, FI, 
LT, EE, CY, CZ, SK, HU 
IS, UK, IE, LU, NL, PT, 
ES, IT, DK, FI, EE, LV, 
LT, CZ, SL, HU, RO, BU, 
CY 
Not recovered: no upturn IE, PT, ES, DK, LV, SL, 
HR, RO, BU, EL 
HR, EL 
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5.2 Regional Economic Resilience 
Of the 280 regions considered, more than a tenth (12%) had weathered the crisis and 
not experienced any fall in numbers employed, whilst almost a quarter (23%) had 
experienced a fall in employment but, by 2011, had recovered to the pre-crisis peak.  
Two-thirds of regions were still to recover by 2011, divided evenly between those that 
had passed the trough of the downturn, and those still to register the end of 
employment decline.  The distribution of regional economic resilience is set out in 
Figure 5.1, which illustrates a strong geography of resilience, clearly influenced by 
national patterns.  However, important pockets of recovery and non-recovery are also 
apparent within this overall geography. 
 
Figure 5.1 Distribution of regional economic resilience (NUTS 2) 
 
 
 
Focusing on those regions that have recovered to their pre-crisis employment levels, 
the average duration for this is 2.6 years.  Whilst this currently captures the most 
responsive economies it does provide a benchmark for resilience against which 
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comparisons can be made.  Significantly, given that almost two-thirds of economies 
experienced peak employment in 2008, with downturn recorded in 2009, we should 
expect to see their recovery in 2012 – for which we still await data – if average 
performance is maintained.  However, for this to occur we would expect to have 
witnessed the beginnings of an upturn by this stage.  This is not the case for all of 
those regions categorized as NR2 – not recovered: no upturn.  Only 10 regions 
entered the downturn post 2009, for these we would not necessarily expect recovery 
by 2011.   
5.3 Comparing regional resilience by employment and GDP  
Figures for GDP resilience at the regional level followed the pattern visible at the 
national level, fewer regions were able to resist the crisis than was the case for 
employment, but more have begun the process of recovery.  Overall, around half of 
regions exhibit similar levels of GDP and employment resilience, with a third proving 
to have been more resilient in their employment performance (Figure 5.2 and Figure 
5.3). 
 
Figure 5.2 GDP vs Employment Resilience 
 
Source: adapted from study data 
 
5.4 Relative resilience 
The distribution of regional resilience between Member States suggests that 
macroeconomic conditions and national policy regimes have an influence on the 
sensitivity of individual regions to economic crisis.  Yet, there are also examples of 
where the experience of individual regions runs counter to national trends, or where 
there is strong variability within Member States.  National effects may be expected to 
be stronger in small and medium sized Member States
7
, where the influence exerted 
by national policy is proportionately greater.  However, even in small Member States, 
variation in relative levels of resilience can be observed. 
 
                                   
7
 In small States (ie those with one NUTS2 region) the distinction between national and regional 
becomes rather artificial.    
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Figure 5.3 Geographies of comparative resilience 
 
 
Our measure of relative resilience is based on our four resilience types, where the 
observed resilience category (employment) of each region is compared with its 
national counterpart.  This is converted into a score, based on the number of degrees 
of separation between the regional and national experience, where 1 means the 
regional economy exhibits the same level of resilience as the regional economy, 
values above 1 means the region was more resilient and values below 1, less resilient.  
Regions can be divided into seven categories (illustrated in Figure 5.5): 
 
 Regions with significantly stronger relative resilience 
 Regions with stronger relative resilience 
 Regions with slightly stronger relative resilience 
 Regions with the same resilience as the national economy 
 Regions with slightly weaker relative resilience 
 Regions with weaker relative resilience 
 Regions with significantly weaker relative resilience  
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The results of this are illustrated for our 280 regions in Figure 5.4.  Most regions 
exhibit a similar level of resilience to their national average.  However, there are some 
significant outliers, where regions either exhibit stronger resilience, compared to the 
national average, or weaker comparative resilience. 
  
Figure 5.4 Relative regional resilience 
 
Source: Calculated from CE study data 
 
Those regions which exhibit a significant difference in their relative resilience 
compared to their national average are set out in Table 5.2. It is noticeable that those 
regions with significantly weaker relative resilience are located in Germany and 
Poland, partly reflecting the better level of national resilience recorded in those two 
countries.  Stronger levels of relative regional resilience are, though, more dispersed, 
covering regions in Finland, Netherlands, Belgium, Norway, Portugal and Romania.  
These relatively resilient regions cover a mix of territorial cases, including an island 
region, capital city region and urban and rural economies with different sectoral 
economic strengths.  The wider geography of relative regional resilience is illustrated 
in Figure 5.5. 
 
Table 5.2 Relative Regional Resilience: outlying cases 
Relative Regional Resilience (R3) Region 
Significantly Stronger R3 Aland (FI
8
) 
Flevoland (NL) 
Stronger R3 Antwerpen (BE) 
Brabant-Wallon (BE) 
Namur (BE) 
Agder og Rogaland (NO) 
Algarve (PT) 
                                   
8
 Aland is an autonomous region of Finland. 
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Bucuresti-Ifov (RO) 
Weaker R3 Slaskie (PL) 
Podkarpackie (PL) 
Wielkopolskie (PL) 
Opolskie (PL) 
Kujawo-Pomorskie (PL) 
Oberfranken (DE) 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (DE) 
Thuringen (DE) 
Brandenburg-Nordost (DE) 
Chemnitz (DE) 
Significantly Weaker R3 Zachnodniopomorskie (PL) 
Sachsen-Anhalt (DE) 
 
 
Figure 5.5 Relative Regional Resilience in the ESPON space 
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5.5 Localised patterns of resilience 
An assessment was also made of the resilience of NUTS 3 regions of the ESPON 
space.  This drew on data from 1,322 territories, using employment data provided by 
Cambridge Econometrics.  A similar pattern of resilience was found to that of the 
NUTS 2 regions, albeit, with a slightly greater proportion of NUTS 3 territories 
having resisted the crisis and a slightly lower proportion of those that had not yet 
recovered having begun an economic upturn (Table 5.3).  The distribution of localized 
resilience patterns is illustrated in Map 5.6. 
 
Figure 5.6 Localised patterns of resilience 
 
 
One of the key findings of the case study reports is the heterogeneity characteristic of 
observed resilience within the regions concerned.  In South West Ireland, there is a 
strong contrast between the experience of metropolitan Cork and the western, more 
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rural, areas of the region, particularly County Kerry.  In Puglia, however, it is the rural 
parts that appear to have a stronger degree of resilience to the economic crisis than the 
urban centres.  In Western Macedonia, the contrast is again apparent, with rural areas 
offering strong resilience characteristics, but also a contrast between areas dependent 
on the fur sector and those on the energy sector.  The former has proven more resilient 
in the face of the crisis than the latter. 
 
Table 5.3 Employment Resilience of NUTS 3 Territories 
Resilience Number of regions Proportion (%) 
Resistant (RS) 214 16.19 
Recovered (RC) 314 23.75 
Not recovered but in upturn 364 27.53 
Not recovered and no upturn 430 32.53 
Source: adapted from study data 
 
Similarly, in Baden-Württemberg, three neighbouring cities provide contrasting 
experiences of resilience to the crisis.  Freiburg, with its concentration of employment 
in service sectors, university and research institutes has demonstrated stable long-term 
economic growth rates; Stuttgart, with its focus on technology-based industrial 
manufacturing, recovered from a short-dip in activity during the crisis to maintain 
high employment levels (albeit with slightly increased unemployment) and high 
income levels; Pforzheim, in contrast, struggles with the economic restructuring of a 
more traditional metals-based industry, higher levels of debt and company 
insolvencies.   
5.6 Historical resilience patterns 
Comparison with the 1990s crisis supports the contention that the effects of the 
current crisis has been more strongly associated with reductions in GDP, and that the 
effects on employment have been less immediate.  In the 1990s crisis less than 5% of 
regions were resistant to the employment effects of the downturn, compared to 12% 
during the current crisis.  In contrast, almost a fifth of regions (19%) demonstrated 
GDP resistance, compared to just 5% during the most recent crisis.  Most strikingly, a 
fifth of regions (52) have never regained their peak employment levels. For four 
regions (1%), located in Germany, Italy, Portugal and the UK, recovery to peak GDP 
levels has still not been achieved. This strong hysteretic effect cautions against any 
assumption that peak levels of employment should form a natural objective following 
an economic shock, but is also suggestive of the important interplay between the 
interaction of economic shocks and longer-term processes of structural 
transformation.  We illustrate the distribution of resistant regions and those that 
demonstrate hysteretic profiles in Figure 5.7. 
 
Further comparisons with the current crisis are difficult to make, as it is problematic 
to compare relative rates of recovery.  Although some seven years have now passed 
since the first aspects of the economic crisis became apparent, experience from the 
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1990s crisis suggests that this is the average time it takes for a region to recover from 
such a deep shock.  However, at one level, regions appear to be more resilient now 
than in the past, as they have generally recovered quicker from the current crisis than 
in the 1990s.  It took four years for 22% of regions to recover to pre-shock 
employment levels following the early 1990s crisis, whereas 23% of regions had 
recovered within three years following the most recent crisis.   
 
Figure 5.7 Historical resilience outcomes (economic shock of early 1990s) 
 
6 Characteristics that influence economic resilience 
 
In our conception of the potential features that influence resilience to economic 
shocks we highlighted the possible role of four main components: 
 Businesses, economy and the business environment 
 People and the population 
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 Place-based characteristics, and 
 Community, or societal, characteristics 
 
We also note the potential role that choices, or ‘agency’, could play.  In the following 
section we review the evidence from both our quantitative analysis and the qualitative 
case study material to explore the relative significance of different territorial 
characteristics in the observed resilience outcomes, including consideration of the 
‘greening’ of economic development paths. We maintain the, admittedly artificial, 
division between our four categories for presentational purposes, in practice the 
interplay between these four features of place is fundamental, complex and highly 
specific. 
6.1 Business, economy and the business environment 
The economic structure of an economy does have some influence on the level of 
observed resilience to the most recent economic crisis.  The decline in the 
construction sector is particularly marked, with considerable implications for regions 
where this was a significant component of economic activity, whilst regions with 
higher levels of agricultural employment have also proved less resilient.  Regions 
which had a greater dependence on the public sector were initially shielded from the 
worst effects of the crisis.  However, since 2011 and the widespread development of 
austerity measures, our qualitative research suggests that this may now be a source of 
weakness in some places.  Regions with high shares of employment in service 
industries have tended to be more likely to prove resilient.  The relationship between 
the level of employment in manufacturing industry and observed resilience is 
complex in the case of employment resilience, but higher levels of manufacturing 
employment are associated with higher levels of GDP resilience. 
 
From our analysis it is also apparent that dependence on particular sectors, or a small 
number of employers, is detrimental to the resilience of the economy.  This was 
particularly apparent with the construction sector, but also extended to the 
manufacturing sector, with examples from the case studies as to how over-dependence 
had led to adverse outcomes, and where diversity had promoted more positive 
outcomes.  There are also exceptions.  Dependence on some sectors promoted 
resilience during the crisis, with concentrations of activity in Financial Services or a 
stronger exposure to high-tech, knowledge intensive industries, as well as niche 
production sectors and those less exposed to cyclical economic cycles (such as health 
and education), experiencing greater resilience.  This is illustrative of the influence of 
differential sectoral experiences during the crisis.  
 
Economic structure is, though, only a partial explanation of resilience.  Our 
qualitative research, drawing on quantitative research within particular places, 
highlights that ownership structures, export orientation and market focus are all 
more significant.  The presence of international companies, with access to 
financial resources and greater expertise, positively assists resilience, as does a 
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strong export orientation to the economy, focused on a more modern production 
techniques. 
 
There is a very strong positive relationship between higher levels of innovation 
performance and observed resilience outcomes.  This is also present for other science 
and technology capacity indicators (such as Human Resources employed in science 
and technology).  Whilst it is not yet possible to identify whether the resilience 
outcome is determined by the level of innovation, or whether innovation and 
resilience are both associated with a more adaptive economy, this is a significant 
finding. 
 
Stable growth patterns prior to an economic shock appear to promote resilience. High 
levels of employment growth in the years preceding the crisis are associated with 
regions that proved less resilient to the crisis.  Lower levels of unemployment prior to 
the crisis also characterise regions that have proved resilient to the economic crisis.  
Taken together this suggests that resilience is a longer-term phenomenon based on 
stable growth rates over longer periods of time.  Whilst higher rates of employment 
are associated with regions that exhibit employment resilience this is less strong 
regarding GDP resilience.  
 
Finally, our case studies also shed some light on the importance of particular business 
strategies in coping with and responding to the crisis. In certain case studies, there is 
strong evidence of the importance of learning from the effects of previous crisis in the 
development of effective strategic responses to this crisis. In Stuttgart in particular, 
the reactions by many firms in the region to the 2008 crisis were shaped by their 
previous experiences and helped create the strong imperative to keep human capital 
inside firms to avoid skill shortages in the recovery period. Firms here, and in 
Pomorskie, appear to have learnt from previous crisis experiences and developed a 
strong focus on self-financial strategies and innovation through the crisis as a means 
of preparing for the future.  In other cases, our respondents reported that the limited 
previous experience of firms in dealing with economic downturn was a limiting 
factor. 
6.2 People and the population 
Population characteristics may have an influence on the economic resilience of 
individual places, particularly where this affects the local labour market.  Certainly, 
lower rates of labour market participation are present in regions that have proved less 
resilient to the crisis.  However, there appear to be few consistently significant 
relationships between population characteristics and resilience outcomes.   
 
The relationship between demographic structure and observed resilience is not 
straightforward, and varies between employment and GDP resilience outcomes. 
Levels of migration prior to the crisis do not appear to have a significant influence on 
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the observed employment resilience of regions, lower levels of in-migration do appear 
to be associated with regions with observed GDP resilience.  
 
One area where relationships are more significant is in the field of qualifications.  
Areas with more highly qualified populations tend to have more positive resilience 
outcomes.  However, simply increasing the extent of educational qualifications does 
not appear to confer greater levels of resilience.  In our analysis the ‘no upturn’ group 
is the group with the second highest increase in educational attainment, after the 
‘resistant’ grouping.  Case studies also reported on the importance of workforce 
experience and managerial skills in promoting resilient outcomes. 
 
The crisis not only affected the levels of employment but also influenced the number 
of hours that were worked, this impact was seen throughout the case study regions.  
The reduction of working hours in order to retain skilled labour and human capital 
was a common strategy adopted by firms and, broadly, accepted by workers as an 
alternative to higher levels of redundancy and potential unemployment.  This 
mutually-agreed strategy is one reason that employment-resilience has proved 
stronger than GDP-resilience. 
 
Although income might be expected to be related to economic resilience, the level of 
household disposable income does not appear to have any relation to observed levels 
of regional resilience, except at the highest quartile level - which has a limited 
relationship to employment resilience, but lower growth rates are positively 
associated with regions that resisted the crisis or recovered.  Again, this may suggest 
that stable, longer-term, growth paths provide a greater degree of resilience.   
 
Data from Ireland for the period 2006-2011 provides a window on the choices made 
by individuals and households in response to the crisis.  This demonstrated a general 
decrease in the numbers reporting that they were looking after the home or family (but 
with a changing gender composition as the number of males doing so increased by 8% 
against a decline of 13% in the number of females). Significantly, whilst the number 
of males joining the labour force over this period has increased by 1% the number of 
females has increased by 12%.   
6.3 Place-based characteristics 
A strong feature of several of the case studies is the significant role played by a major 
urban centre in promoting the resilience of the surrounding economy.  This was 
identified in the case of Cork, Ireland; the tri-city of Gdansk-Gdinya-Sopot in 
Pomorskie, Poland; Tallinn, Estonia and Helsinki, Uusimaa.  This is reinforced by 
quantitative results that demonstrate how the presence of an urban centre, particularly 
second-tier centres, is positively associated with resilience.   
 
By contrast, regions that are remote; have external borders, or have high levels of 
population living in mountainous or coastal areas all tend to have proven less resilient 
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to the economic crisis.  Further analysis of these results is required to control for 
potential uneven spatial distributions, which might bias the findings, but the greater 
challenges presented by these features is notable. 
 
Regions with higher levels of accessibility tend to be associated with more resilient 
outcomes.  This was reinforced by the findings of the case studies.  In the case of 
South West Ireland, the port facilities were regarded as an important dimension of the 
ability of the region to engage with global markets.  The significance of port facilities 
was also reported in Uusimaa, Pomorskie and Estonia.  In Puglia, the port facilities 
were seen as a positive element for the economy, together with the connections 
promoted by the local airport.  Air links were also important for the City of Cork and 
for Helsinki.   In each case the links helped to underpin economic activity, and 
overcome peripheral geographic locations. Higher levels of broadband availability 
also appear to be related with regions with more resilient outcomes. 
 
A high quality natural environment can also contribute to a higher standard of living 
in an area, with potential positive implications for the resilience of a region.  This was 
the case in Pomorskie, Poland, where the quality of the natural environment was 
remarked upon as a positive element in the area’s ability to attract inward investment 
and skilled labour.  To a certain extent it was felt that this could act as a 
counterweight to the higher salaries on offer in the capital Warsaw.  Strong levels of 
natural capital were also reported to underpin more resilient agricultural and tourism 
sectors in South West Ireland and Puglia.  
 
Planning regimes and the property market, which act to shape places, can influence 
resilience, with the collapse of inflated property markets in both Ireland and Estonia 
major factors underpinning the economic crisis in each country.  Planning regimes are 
reported to have had some impact on observed levels of resilience in a small number 
of our case study regions.  Whilst the overall impact in South West Ireland was 
negative, owing to the readiness of the system to grant permission for residential and 
commercial development, some positive attributes are also identified.  The Cork Area 
Strategic Plan (CASP) developed for the wider metropolitan area of Cork is widely 
regarded in the region as a model for strategic development planning, and is regarded 
as having moderated the excesses of the property boom, leaving Cork better-placed 
during the economic crisis.  In Stuttgart, also, a strong strategic planning approach, 
that is able to combine plan-making with infrastructure investments alongside 
transport and economic policies, is argued to underpin the longer-term development 
of the economy and so contribute to their observed resilience.   
 
Although not strictly a ‘place-based’ characteristic, it is also useful to consider the 
significance of a region’s status under the EU’s Cohesion Policy, as this influences 
the levels of external assistance provided through the EU’s Structural Funds and can 
impact on levels of eligible aid intensity.  Using eligibility status under the 2007-13 
programming period, we find that regions that were eligible under the 
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Competitiveness and Eligibility strand of the Structural Funds proved to be 
disproportionately likely to have resisted or recovered from the crisis.   
 
In contrast, regions eligible under the Convergence strand have proven less able to 
resist or recover from the crisis, with a significantly lower proportion of regions in the 
recovered category, and over-representation in both not recovered categories.  
Transition regions have also fared poorly in the crisis, with a particularly high 
proportion of regions still experiencing decline in 2011.   
6.4 Community and societal characteristics 
The ECR2 project sought to explore the role that community-based features could 
play in the economic resilience of the region as a whole.  What emerges are a number 
of features that appear to have some impact on observed levels of resilience.  Whilst 
rarely strong enough to impact directly on the ability of an economy to withstand the 
effects of an economic crisis they are able to play an important role in shaping the 
way in which it responds and the opportunities available to communities. 
 
Several of our studies report on the significance of business networks, and inter-firm 
social capital, in shaping responses to the economic crisis.  In Baden-Württemberg, it 
is reported that larger firms or owners of family owned firms often offered short-term 
guarantees and loans to help out firms that were facing insolvency.  This corresponds 
with wider research reporting on how larger firms offered payment holidays, or made 
credit available to their supply chains.  Similarly, formal and informal business 
networks in other regions were important agents in promoting adaptation and mutual 
support.   
 
Amongst residential communities there is also some evidence that the strength of 
social capital networks have affected the ability of places to respond to the effects of 
the crisis.  In both Uusimaa and Estonia it is reported that a tradition of self-reliance 
has resulted in communities taking responsibility for their own well-being during the 
crisis. Similarly in South West Ireland and Wales, strong levels of social capital have 
contributed to the response of communities to the crisis, although in the case of South 
West Ireland, the effect have been unevenly distributed and, in many ways, is being 
stimulated by the effects of the crisis and a senses of fending for themselves.  Across 
several of the case studies an increase in volunteering bore witness to communities 
seeking local solutions and responses. 
 
The role of community-based initiatives in countering the consequences of the 
economic downturn featured in all the cases studied.  At the very local scale the 
development of strong localist agendas, epitomized by ‘buy-local’ campaigns formed 
one response to the crisis.  In no case were significant initiatives identified that had 
made a strong impact on the observed level of resilience within the regions concerned.  
However, there is evidence from other locations of the role that a variety of long-
standing initiatives, such as alternative currencies, can play in tempering the effects of 
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economic downturns.  The role of such potential ‘safety-valves’ in supporting 
resilience over the longer-term merits further consideration. 
 
Across the cases studied the economic crisis has led to a renewed interest in the 
potential offered by entrepreneurship.  Several of the regions already have strong 
entrepreneurial cultures and some report that this provides a greater diversity of 
activity and enables local communities to maintain economic activity.  In areas where 
there has been less importance attached to entrepreneurship, such as Western 
Macedonia, the economic crisis has exposed the inability of existing structures to 
adapt and has led to an increasing interest in the potential alternatives offered by 
starting new businesses.  There is, though, limited evidence from the cases studied, or 
our wider quantitative analysis, of a more entrepreneurial culture making an 
observable difference to resilience experiences.  Evidence from South West Ireland, 
for example, suggests that higher levels of entrepreneurship have not led to stronger 
resilience outcomes.  
 
There is also some evidence from the case studies that the nature of welfare regimes 
can influence the resilience of regions.  This was reported in the case of Uusimaa, 
where the social compact provides for strong redistribution effects.  Similarly in 
economies where there is an emphasis on collective bargaining the social compact 
between firms, states and workers can also impact on observed levels of resilience.  
This was remarked upon in the case of South West Ireland, in Uusimaa, in Stuttgart 
and in Western Macedonia.  The effects of this were not uniform though. 
 
Finally, the project considered the role of governance in promoting more resilient 
outcomes.  Overall, it was found that fragmented governance structures impeded 
resilience.  Resilience appears to be enhanced where public authorities work together 
with neighbouring authorities; where different levels of government work together 
towards shared objectives, and where there is a collaborative approach to working 
with economic and social partners.   
 
Where local government has more limited powers, this appears to act against 
resilience, although the finding is not without exceptions
9
.  A key consideration 
appears to be the extent to which sub-national governments have the capability to act, 
not just the capacity. Equally, there also has to be the willingness to use those powers 
that are available.  In Western Macedonia it is reported that available resources from 
the Compensatory Fund, available from the DEI operations, were not fully utilized, 
whilst in South West Ireland, it is also reported that County Kerry did not make use of 
the opportunity to levy an economic development fund, unlike the neighbouring 
County and City of Cork. 
                                   
9
 Including where greater levels of power or autonomy are associated with reduced levels of resilience 
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6.6 Green development paths and resilience 
Overall, the crisis has had no clearly discernible or obviously transformative effect 
upon their development path. For some regions, such as Pomorskie in Poland and 
Baden-Württemberg in Germany this is because progress towards renewable energy is 
seen as a both an existing pathway and a long-term commitment, and is somthing 
largely unaffected by the crisis. In Baden-Württemberg, political decisions at federal 
and state level in support of renewables such as on-shore wind energy were regarded 
as more significant in influencing this pathway than the economic crisis. In most of 
our other regional case studies, it is either simply too early to discern what, if any, 
transformative effects the crisis has had, or the efforts of dealing with the crisis has 
been all-consuming and has limited the potential for anything more than rhetorical 
statements from regional actors to emerge as yet. 
 
There is some evidence that the crisis initially accelerated green economy ambitions 
and practices in some case study regions, particularly those where greening strategies 
were already in place, such as Wales and Puglia.  However, this has not made a 
discernable impact on their observed resilience; whether this is because the green 
economy is not yet fully-developed; is not visible in any statistics, or does not have a 
positive impact on resilience is too early to tell.  However, we also found some 
evidence that the crisis and the tighter fiscal conditions it ultimately promoted, 
significantly affected the priority afforded to greening strategies, suggesting that, in 
contrast to competitiveness and innovation, green growth is not seen as a priority at a 
time of fiscal tightening. Our case studies also highlight the importance of 
understanding greening strategies and transitions in their contexts. They clearly reveal 
the importance of national and federal government agendas and strategies in shaping 
regional government agendas. 
 
At a more ‘grass-roots’ level, the economic crisis raised fundamental questions about 
the basis of a market-led economy driven by financial institutions, leading to a 
groundswell of popular counter-movements and an exploration of alternative 
possibilities.  Whilst our case studies, and wider research, has cast doubt on the extent 
to which the development of more sustainable, and greener, development pathways 
affected the resilience of particular places, they do offer glimpses of alternative 
possibilities.  In particular, this focuses on the role of green, sustainability-based 
activities not as a driver of economic growth and development but as insulation from 
the perturbations of market cycles.  Such activities are not an alternative to 
mainstream economic activities.  However, they might act to complement such 
activities, providing societal outcomes that could include the potential to act as a 
buffering influence on the possible risks associated with future economic shocks. 
6.7 Agency and choice 
Alongside important structural features that appear to influence levels of resilience the 
role of agency and choice also emerged as formative influences on the nature of 
response to crisis.  This manifests itself in two key dimensions: the ability to learn, 
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and the ability to adapt.  Both influence the choices made, which, in turn, influences 
the resilience outcomes observed. 
 
The significance of learning from past events was a consistent message across the 
cases studied for this project.  In Baden-Württemberg, businesses sought to retain 
labour owing to the lessons learnt during the previous shock of the early 2000s when 
they cut staffing levels to fast and too deep.  In South West Ireland, politicians from 
the City of Cork highlighted how they had learnt from the dramatic ‘smokestack’ 
collapse of traditional manufacturing in the 1980s and were still applying the lessons 
learnt then regarding the importance of a diverse and competitive export-orientated 
economy.  In other cases, it was remarked that the fact that there had been no 
experience of similar downturns in the past had hindered the ability of firms or 
government actors to respond.   
 
There is also evidence that a willingness, and capability, to adapt over both the short 
and the medium-term aids resilience outcomes.  Evidence lies in the choices made by 
workers and employers in making short-term changes to working hours and 
compensation arrangements during the duration of the crisis.  Equally, firms and 
economies that were able to develop new markets proved more able to manage the 
economic crisis than those that did not.  Workers and households affected by 
redundancy also developed adaptive strategies, based on new labour market choices.   
 
It is in these adaptive strategies that we begin to see the first signs of transformative 
effects of the crisis emerging, such as increasing rates of entrepreneurship.  However, 
in some cases the choices made appear to constrain adaptation.  It is suggested by sme 
firms that this is the case in Uusimaa, Finland, where short-term subsidies to reduce 
workforce losses effectively locked-in structures which, it is argued, require 
transformation to ensure future competitiveness.  Similarly, in Western Macedonia, 
the choices made in the past to further tie economic success to the fortunes of DEI, 
are affecting the ability of the region to respond to the current crisis. 
6.8 Regions are complex systems 
The consistent theme emerging from our cases, and quantitative analysis, is that not 
only does each region experience the economic crisis differently but that the interplay 
of factors that influence this is also uniquely different.  Whilst the univariate and 
bivariate techniques employed by the project demonstrate strong, and relatively 
consistent, relationships between observed resilience outcomes (of both employment 
and GDP) and a number of key variables the results of multivariate techniques are 
more complex and offer poor levels of explanatory power.  Numerous models have to 
be run before ones demonstrating a good fit between observed outcomes and potential 
independent variables can be identified, and these tend to rely heavily on the 
significance of dummy variables.   
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In turn, the inter-connectivity of places, through value-chains and supply-chains, may 
also impact on levels of resilience.  This is remarked upon in the case of Estonia, 
whose firms benefited from efforts to stimulate the Finnish economy.  Arguably, it 
also serves to underpin observed resilience in Pomorskie and Baden-Württemberg 
where German competitiveness is supported by a pool of low-wage, well-educated 
and highly productive workers in Poland, whose firms benefit from German market 
access.  Detailed data on these inter-relationships is not yet available, although 
academic work on this is ongoing. 
 
It is tempting to think that more data may enable more robust models to be derived 
but the analysis makes clear that the interactions are complex, that the direction of 
influence can often reverse depending upon specificities of regional contexts, and that 
the characteristics identified only explain a part of the resilience observed.  It is likely 
that other factors are also at play, and that the role of policy will be a further 
important influence. In this context, it may be optimistic to assume that resilience at a 
regional level can be robustly modelled.  
7 The role of territorial policy responses 
 
The scale of the economic crisis precipitated a substantial level of intervention by 
public authorities.  These interventions occurred at an international, national and 
subnational scale, as authorities sought to stem the effects of the economic shock 
rippling across global and European economies.  The economic crisis has reinforced 
the policy focus on jobs, enterprise, growth and competitiveness that was visible prior 
to the crisis.  However, it has also led to a renewed attention being directed to the 
potential role of public policy in enhancing the capacity of national and regional 
economies to absorb the effects of an economic shock, to adapt to the consequences 
of this and to use it as a stimulus for transformation, with a strong emphasis on the 
importance of adaptive capacities 
7.1 Policy roles in promoting resilience 
Whilst it is tempting to focus on policy responses in the aftermath of a shock, our case 
studies demonstrate that it is policy decisions taken in the years and even decades 
prior to a shock that shape the capability of the region to respond to the shock itself.  
It is thus worth considering how policy can: 
 React to a shock – stabilising the situation 
 Respond to a shock – promoting recovery 
 Prepare for future shocks – building resilience 
 
A key role for public policy in the aftermath of an economic shock is to stabilize the 
situation, both through its own actions and through helping to reduce the uncertainties 
facing households and firms, and so assist in maintaining investment and consumption 
decisions.  Clear examples of stabilization polices are present throughout our study.  
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These were most visible at international and national levels, partly owing to the 
intensity of the economic shock experienced, ranging from fiscal stimuli; initiatives to 
maintain credit and liquidity flows; automatic fiscal stabilisers, and measures to 
maintain labour markets.  Sub-national examples are also present, particularly 
regarding labour market support measures, although these were often tied to national 
initiatives.   
 
Evidence from the cases studied all points to the significance of having familiar but 
flexible policy instruments available as positive influence on the ability to react to a 
shock.  It takes time for new policy instruments to be agreed, and additional time for 
beneficiaries and implementing organisations to become familiar with new 
instruments.  Familiar, or at least known, instruments are more able to be applied 
quickly.  In Germany the short-time working allowance proved remarkably effective 
at maintaining employment levels in firms through a period of reduced demand and 
enabled firms to respond positively to the subsequent upturn in global markets. This 
instrument has been available since the 1950s, but in the face of the crisis, policy 
makers were able to rapidly extended it from a 6-month subsidy period to a two-year 
subsidy period and increase the amount of support available to individual firms.  In 
contrast, both Ireland and Greece reported that the development of new financial 
support instruments took several years.   
 
Very often, our cases have found that firms, households and communities have 
reacted to the crisis without the intervention of policy-makers.  Firms provided 
suppliers with payment holidays, others provided credit guarantees or soft loans to 
firms with temporary cashflow problems.  Similarly, firms, workers and unions 
agreed temporary reductions in working hours and/or wages to counter the effects of 
the crisis.  This emphasizes our previous point that a key role of policy should be to 
seek to ensure that mutual insurance schemes are available throughout regional 
economies (and more widely) to enable self-organising response and adaptation 
mechanisms to operate effectively.  There is some evidence that these can be as 
effective and certainly more responsive than public-policy led interventions.  
 
One reaction to the economic crisis of course has been the austerity measures 
implemented as one part of the prevailing sovereign debt crisis.  This has precluded 
many traditional counter-cyclical policy instruments (and so places greater store on 
self-organised mutual response mechanisms).  It has also highlighted the important 
role played by international institutional arrangements for sharing risk.  The role of 
Cohesion Policy instruments, such as the Structural Funds, takes on a heightened 
importance in this regard, as they offer a mechanism for transferring external 
resources to fiscally constrained economies.  Reaction to the crisis was relatively 
rapid and there are numerous examples, even from our limited sample, of programmes 
flexibly responding to changing circumstances.  Amendments to the Regulations 
governing the Structural Funds provided room to manouevre by programme 
authorities, even if not all took advantage of the opportunities available. 
41 
ESPON ECR2 DRAFT FINAL REPORT 
 
The challenge for policy-makers is how to respond to an economic shock over the 
medium-term and promote recovery.  In part this requires consideration of the 
question as to what extent a shock changes the underlying conditions facing an 
economy.  There are positive examples of how policy-makers have recognized that 
circumstances are changed and have sought to introduce new modes of activity.  
There has been a strong emphasis in many economies on policies to stimulate 
entrepreneurship and establish vehicles for financial investments in firms.  The 
aftermath of an economic shock offers the opportunity to take stock and consider new 
development pathways.  In Baden-Württemberg, for example, policy-makers are now 
more aware that the economy is overly-dependent on a small number of key sectors 
and major firms.  In Uusimaa, firms and policy-makers are questioning whether the 
economy requires further transformation, in the light of its slow recovery.   The ability 
to reflect, and to learn from past experience, is a crucial skill for resilient economies. 
 
These learning processes operate over longer timescales and emphasise the 
importance of existing policy measures that can adapt to economic shocks.  It is 
perhaps noticeable that there have been very few fundamental changes to the 
Structural Fund programmes (2007-13) during the crisis itself.  In general, programme 
amendments have amounted to a re-distribution of resources amongst previously 
agreed priorities and measures.  This appears to have been led by logic of financial 
absorption, although programme authorities argue that it reflects the fact that the 
underlying logic of the programmes remains sound over the longer-term.  This 
reflects the argument that the Structural Fund programmes are broadly regarded as 
supporting longer-term, structural, economic adjustment rather than acting as a short-
term stimulus measure.  This perspective holds even in those programmes that are 
described by participants and programme authorities as ‘small-scale’ or ‘niche’. 
 
The foundations of resilient economies are formed over a sustained period of time.  
Policies that support the development of competitive, diverse, export-orientated 
economies with high-levels of innovation performance take time to bear fruit. This is 
clearly demonstrated in the case of South West Ireland, where the observed relative 
resilience of the Cork metropolitan area is founded on three decades of consistent 
policy development.  By contrast, our case study research also demonstrates the 
potential perils of an over-dependence on mono-functional economies.  The role of 
sub-national authorities in supporting the development of more resilient economic 
structures is crucial, given the importance of place-based policy making. 
 
A longer time horizon also favours the development of policies promoting more stable 
growth paths.  Regional economies that grew most rapidly prior to the economic 
crisis, often fueled by pro-cyclical policies, tended to be less resilient than those with 
lower growth rates, as evidenced in South West Ireland and Estonia.  There is a role 
for coordinated efforts here at both the national and sub-national scale. 
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In preparing the ground for a more resilient economy, policy-makers should move 
beyond traditional socio-economic concerns.  Whilst efforts to secure economic 
growth and jobs are fundamental to long-term economic resilience equally important 
is the adaptive capacity of the economy.  This indicates a new consideration for 
policy-makers, one aimed at stimulating the ability of firms, households and 
communities to adapt to changing circumstances.  The significance of this was 
demonstrated across all of the case studies, with adaptive characteristics the signature 
of resilient outcomes. 
 
The role of government during an economic shock is then to provide short-term 
support in order to facilitate change, whilst considering the implication of the existing 
economic shock, and adopted policy measures, for resilience to potential future 
shocks.  In so doing, consideration should also be given to the adaptive capacity of 
public authorities themselves and the policies and institutions that are available.  
Evidence from the case studies is that the ability to react to the economic crisis partly 
depended upon the pre-existence of suitable policy measures, and institutional 
capacity, that could be adapted to new circumstances.   
 
Similarly, in some circumstances long-standing institutional structures proved to be 
unsuited to the demands imposed by the economic crisis, and can be seen as a 
contributory factor to lower resilience outcomes.  Crucially, on several occasions 
authorities were found not to have made use of the powers and authorities available to 
them, often hindering their ability to develop more robust and resilient economic 
structures.  
 
The lead in time of policy emphasizes the importance of policies that are anticipatory, 
as well as reactive.  Whilst it is not possible to predict the precise timing and format 
of an economic shock, it is certainly possible to predict that economic shocks will 
occur in the future.  A key role for policy is to consider the implications of this, and 
how the development of the economy affects the economic resilience of the region.  
Have short-term responses and reactions to the crisis left the economy better or worse 
placed to meet the demands of a future shock for example?  How vulnerable is the 
region to future shocks.  A possible role for public policy here is to act as a 
monitoring agent, examining the potential resilience of the economy to future 
economic shocks, rather than the more traditional economic performance monitoring.  
In this way the policy approach to economic resilience goes full circle, from 
preparation to reaction to response to anticipation and back to preparation. 
7.2 Place-based policies – policy integration and co-production 
From the evidence available, it is clear that place-based and integrated actions can 
play a very strong role in promoting resilience.  Endogenous conditions tend to 
become more important during an economic downturn than in the upturn, weaknesses 
are accentuated and strengths rewarded.  Thus, it is essential to tackle the specific 
challenges facing particular places.  These tend to be most fully understood by sub-
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national policy actors.  Locally-based actions can also be better targeted to meet the 
particular needs of local economies.  Social and business networks are also centred on 
places, which provides a further stimulus to the value of place-based actions. 
 
However, the experience of sub-national authorities during the past crisis, and in the 
time leading up to it, also demonstrates the limitations of local-actions.  The ability to 
mobilise finances and resources are greater at the national level, particularly when not 
all places are experiencing the economic shock to the same extent.  Resilience is 
strengthened where risks can be shared across territories.  The value of this has been 
seen across the EU, with the Structural Funds providing resources to support 
transformative actions and fiscal stimulus in adversely affected regions.  However, 
where national policies withdraw from localities so resilience can be weakened as the 
ability to respond to the crisis reduces.   
 
The emergent message is that actions that integrate national and sub-national 
approaches are to be preferred over those that focus exclusively on one or the other.  
This raises new challenges for places that have less capacity, or capability, to engage 
with national policy initiatives.  In particular it suggests that there are new roles for 
sub-national authorities, to act as signposts to alternative sources of support or to 
facilitate the ability of others to access this, rather than to directly intervene 
themselves.   
 
Reliance on national policy initiatives can raise questions as to how places that may 
be passed over by national initiatives, owing to the structure of their economy for 
example, can strengthen their own resilience.  Equally, there are questions as to how 
effective national initiatives can be in the face of localized shocks, or highly 
differentiated sub-national experiences.  These are not insurmountable.  
 
Actions that integrate different policies tend to be best constructed at the sub-national 
level, as local specificities demand a more nuanced approach.  This forms the 
foundation of any place-based approach.  The example in Baden-Württemberg of 
combining ESF-financed training alongside Federal short-time working allowances is 
a powerful one, although debates on its overall effectiveness continue.  To facilitate 
policy integration a more objectives-led approach might offer dividends, compared to 
the problem-led approach that is often adopted. 
 
The fundamental role of place-based, and integrated, policies is less about how it can 
react and respond to economic shocks, but how places can be strengthened to make 
them less vulnerable to shocks in the longer-term.  Here there are clear gains to be 
made from taking place-based approaches.  However, there are also limitations to 
place-based actions.  Local actors do not always make good choices.  The effects of 
the crisis have been exacerbated in Ireland by the loose application of planning 
powers by local planning authorities.  A similar experience is reported in Spain, 
coupled with large municipal and regional debts.  Authorities also do not always make 
44 
ESPON ECR2 DRAFT FINAL REPORT 
use of the powers available to them.  There is role for oversight and for a sharing of 
responsibility. 
7.3 Promoting adaptive approaches 
There are numerous traditional policy instruments available to policy makers that can 
enhance the resilience of regional economies.  We have highlighted some examples of 
these.  The evidence suggests that rather than focusing on individual initiatives, 
resilience is based upon building the systemic ability of an economy to withstand, 
absorb and recover from economic shocks.  To do so does not require radical changes 
to existing policy approaches, merely a slight change in emphasis.  It does, though, 
require the concerted actions of policy actors at the European, national and sub-
national scales. This requires the development of adaptive policies and institutions, 
that are able to evolve to meet the particularities of different shocks, rather than 
entrenching established models that lock an economy in to outmoded responses.    
 
Policies should also be developed that support the ability of firms to adapt to new 
circumstances.  There is a role for short-term policies that support firms in the 
immediate aftermath of a shock, but more significant are policies that build longer-
term adaptive capacities, these include supporting innovation-capabilities, access to 
new market opportunities and developing higher-level skills and experience. 
 
Policies that support households and workers to adapt to new economic circumstances 
are also to be encouraged.  Again, some of these will be short-term mitigation 
measures, but others will focus on building skills and experience that are transferable 
and that promote entrepreneurial skills.  Policy makers will want to consider how 
short-term responses to economic shocks, such as reductions in wages or hours-
worked, do not become permanent as the economy recovers.   
 
Policies will also need to build the adaptive capacity of particular places.  This will 
differ according to place, but will include consideration of the economic structure of 
the economy; developing innovation capabilities, and seeking to avoid over-
dependence on a narrow range of activities.  Policy makers will also wish to avoid 
short-term solutions that replicate or enhance existing vulnerabilities in regional 
economies and which delay the introduction of transformative actions.  Similarly, 
there is a strong role for counter-cyclical policies that dampen unsustainable growth 
rates.   In the context of a wider monetary union, policy-makers may have to explore 
alternatives to the traditional roles played by interest rate policies.   
 
Policy makers may also wish to facilitate the adaptive capacity of the wider 
community, to enable the community to do more and public authorities to do less.  
The significant role played by social networks, both in business and between citizens, 
is a notable feature of more resilient communities, able to self-organise and mutually-
support.  Facilitating the growth of embedded social capital takes time.  Consideration 
might also be given to the potential role of investments in alternative market 
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activities, that enable residents to reduce their dependency on earned income.  
Alternative currencies are one example here, another is in the field of community-
based energy schemes.   
 
An important role for policy-makers will be in terms of monitoring the potential 
vulnerability of their economy to economic shocks, not in the sense of being able to 
predict particular shocks, but rather the ability of an economy to absorb the effects of 
potential shocks.  Here, traditional indicators may be of limited value.  Of more 
significance is the shared knowledge that is developed of an economy in a more 
qualitative sense. Potential considerations include: 
1. How vulnerable is the prevailing economic system to disruption 
2. How vulnerable are key components of the system 
3. What are the prevailing directions of change 
4. Available policy responses 
5. Assessment of adaptive capability 
6. Risk assessment of key dependencies 
 
The role of monitoring tools is not solely to provide information on which an 
authority may act.  It is a shared endeavour that also seeks to influence the perceptions 
and actions of others.  One of the less remarked roles of policy makers is how they 
construct narratives and influence behavior, through (knowingly and unknowingly) 
informing choices made by households and firms.  The constructed narrative can 
serve to enhance the resilience properties of a region, or weaken them.  The effects of 
both have been visible before and during the present crisis.  A dimension to this role 
is the potential that policy makers offer to reduce uncertainty and so encourage 
investment.   
 
Finally, we should not overlook the importance of the capacity and capability of 
policy makers themselves.  The crisis has highlighted the importance of experience, 
resources and aptitude for positive policy making, for taking responsibility for change 
rather than leaving it to others.  It emphasizes the importance of learning cultures in 
learning regions.  This capacity and capability is not available in all cases and national 
reforms are, in some cases seeking to overcome identified weaknesses.  More 
significant will be to take the opportunity to build the capacity to develop adaptive 
policy approaches over time.  Consideration should be given mechanisms for building 
the capacity and capability for sub-national policy making across Europe.  This 
should not seek to replicate existing good practices but rather to build the knowledge 
and awareness of alternative approaches and to build the capacity to act in the future. 
7.4 Policy conclusions 
There is no single set of policies that can, or should, be applied consistently across all 
territories approach to promote resilient economies.  No two shocks are the same, nor 
do any two territories respond to a shock in the same way.  Small variations in starting 
conditions can lead to extremely divergent results, whilst looking backwards only tells 
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us what worked there then.  There is also a risk that we equate policy, actions and 
results, when in fact the causal relationships are much less certain.   
 
However, certain lessons can be learnt from the most recent crisis, and those that 
preceded it, as to the role that policy can play.  The role of policy itself can, perhaps, 
be summarized as seeking to prevent a shock from becoming a crisis.  To do so 
involves three, inter-related, sets of actions: 
 To stabilize the situation following a shock, and prevent circumstances 
worsening further 
 To share the risks associated with a shock, in order to limit the absolute effects 
on particular individuals or localities 
 To reduce the vulnerability of an economy to a shock event, in order to limit 
the absolute effects as a whole  
 
Through our work the need for policy to support the development of adaptive 
capacities in firms, households and communities has come to the fore.  It is this 
adaptive capacity that enables regional economies to withstand, absorb and respond to 
economic shocks and so strengthens the economic resilience of the territory.  Our 
research highlights that to support resilience policies also need to be adaptive, and that 
public authorities have the capacity and capability to make the best use of the tools 
available.   
 
Resilient economies are not the outcome of activities by any single agent, it is a 
collective endeavour shaped by policies operating at multiple scales, as well as by the 
activities of other economic and social actors.  One important role for public 
authorities is in shaping a narrative and understanding of resilience and economic 
shocks, such that it guides the actions of others, without direct intervention. 
8 Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
The recent economic crisis has witnessed the most severe economic downturn in the 
history of the European Union.  Yet not all regions experienced economic decline and 
rates of recovery have varied greatly.  This differentiated experience raises important 
questions as to why some regions prove to be more resilient to economic shocks than 
others, and what influences the observed resilience outcomes.  ECR2 sought to 
answer these questions, whilst considering the territorial impact of the most recent 
crisis, the observed resilience of regions to the crisis and the role of policy in 
strengthening resilience and promoting recovery. 
 
Although the crisis is generally regarded to have begun in 2008, the first signs of 
impending problems were visible in 2007.  This is reflected in the data, where 
significant proportions of regions began to experience economic decline in 2007, with 
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the depth of the crisis broadly experienced in 2009.  The first signs of recovery began 
to emerge in 2010, but progress has been slow.   
 
The economic crisis has not been a single event, but rather consists of three distinct – 
though interrelated – elements: an initial financial crisis, which sparked a wide-
ranging ‘credit crunch’; a sovereign debt crisis, where high levels of public debt 
(partly driven by the bail out of national banking sectors) proved difficult to sustain in 
financial markets, and a more traditional slump in demand, as adversely affected firms 
and households reduce their expenditure.  
 
The effects of the crisis across the ESPON space have been well-documented.  It has 
led to a fall in economic output, a decline in overall levels of employment and an 
increase in unemployment.  Economic trade and levels of foreign investment initially 
declined but soon rebounded, whilst different economic sectors have recorded 
differential performance.  Overall, wages have stagnated and austerity measures have 
affected many economies severely.  Not all regions have been equally affected and 
more detailed analysis of national data illustrates the varied spatial geometry of the 
crisis, setting a clear macro-economic context for the economic resilience of regions.   
 
Despite the severity of the economic crisis around a third of NUTS 2 regions have 
proved resilient to its effects.  Of these around a tenth (12%) of all regions did not 
experience any decline in employment levels and 23% have since recovered to their 
pre-crisis peak employment levels.  Of the remaining two-thirds of regions, one half 
have begun the path to recovery, but the remainder remain mired in decline.  There 
are strong national patterns identifiable in the spatial distribution of national economic 
resilience, but this is not a sufficient explanation for the observed resilience on its 
own.  Our exploration of relative regional resilience provides a useful insight into 
which regions exhibit relative strengths, and weaknesses, within states.   
 
Evidence from past crises, particularly that of the early 1990s, suggests that the 
average recovery duration can last up to seven years, suggesting that recovery would 
only be occurring now and so not picked up by our data.  Indeed, from the evidence 
available it appears that the rate of recovery under the current crisis is proceeding 
slightly faster than occurred in the 1990s.  However, evidence from the 1990s also 
highlights the long-tail of regions that took more than ten years to recover to pre-crisis 
employment levels, and that a fifth of regions never achieved this, despite the long 
economic boom during the first decade of the Millenium. 
 
Our analysis has highlighted a number of factors that are positively associated with 
more resilient regions.  These include more diverse, export-orientated economies, 
with the presence of international companies.  Sectoral composition is also important. 
Strong concentrations of construction and agricultural activity are associated with less 
resilient economies.  Economies with a higher share of service-based activities tend to 
have proved more resilient.  The significance of manufacturing industry is less clear, 
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demonstrating a need for greater disaggregation but also that the industry sector is less 
influential than the business models adopted.  A flexible and adaptive workforce, with 
higher levels of skills and qualifications, also aids resilience.  However, simply 
increasing the density of qualifications in the population does not appear to offer a 
short-cut route to resilience.  There is a strong relationship between the innovation 
performance of a region and its observed resilience outcomes. 
 
Initial analysis of the data suggests that place-based characteristics can also influence 
observed levels of resilience.  Urban areas, and those close to urban areas, tend to be 
more resilient, with more remote regions proving less so.  Similarly regions with 
higher proportions of population living in mountainous and coastal communities have 
proven to be less resilient to the current crisis.  These findings deserve further 
exploration.  Regions with external borders are also disadvantaged in their resilience 
outcomes, with internal borders (EFTA and EU) having some impact but with less 
significance.  The accessibility of a place can also influence levels of observed 
resilience. 
 
The role of community features in resilience merits further exploration.  It appears 
that social networks are a significant mechanism for mediating the effects of an 
economic shock, whilst community-based responses can provide important 
opportunities for limiting local impacts.  The significance of these mechanisms for 
overall resilience outcomes could not be tested.  Equally, the project finds evidence 
that weak and fragmented governance structures impede resilience outcomes, but 
finds contrasting evidence for the potential role of greater levels of fiscal autonomy. 
 
Policy roles in promoting resilience are significant.  The foundations for resilient 
outcomes have been laid over a long-period of time, whilst the challenges facing non-
resilient economies are equally long-standing.  There is a clear role for policy makers 
in preparatory actions that support the development of resilience capacities and 
capabilities.  Similarly, the project has identified a series of policy-approaches that 
successfully helped stabilize regional economies in the face of the economic crisis.  
These operated at an international, national and regional scale.  Policy interventions 
were more readily mobilized where they could draw on pre-existing instruments and 
institutions.   
 
Cohesion Policies formed part of successful policy responses to promote more 
resilient economies.  They did so through sharing risks and mobilizing external fiscal 
support; through actions that helped to stabilize adverse economic pressures, and by 
helping to build absorptive, adaptive and transformational capacities.  However, in 
many cases Structural Fund programmes found it more difficult to react and respond 
to the unfolding consequences of the economic crisis. 
 
Responses to the economic crisis illustrate how economies reorientate as part of a 
process of economic recovery. They also provide glimpses of transformative effects 
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engendered by economic shocks. However, the constraining effects of shocks on 
transformative actions are also visible, such as evidenced by our exploration of green 
development paths, navigating this complex environment is a key policy challenge.      
 
Our work clearly demonstrates the validity of the place-based approach to policy 
action.  The effects of the economic crisis have varied across and within places and, 
consequently, the place-based approach is the most appropriate means of building 
resilience over the longer-term.  The experience of the recent crisis illustrates the 
importance of seeing this as a shared responsibility between multi-level governance 
actors.  The distribution of responsibilities will vary across contexts but the principle 
is sound.  Resilience is both a property of a complex economic system and a shared 
responsibility for those involved in managing that system. 
 
Promoting resilience involves supporting the development of adaptive capacities and 
capabilities throughout the system.  This raises new roles for public authorities and 
highlights the significance of adaptive and responsive governance institutions as a 
critical feature of resilient regions.  
Recommendations 
 
There is no one route to resilience and recovery, it is place-dependent and 
contextually texturized.  Rather than focus on particular policy approaches that will 
only be appropriate in particular contexts we draw our wider recommendations here.  
A key recommendation is that building resilience capabilities should be a founding 
objective for public policy. 
 
To achieve this we recommend that a key role for policy is the building of adaptive 
capacities and capabilities within economies, rather than solely focusing on economic 
growth and employment. In doing so, consideration should also be given to building 
the adaptive capabilities of public policy bodies and policy institutions. 
 
There is an important role for EU Cohesion Policy here.  The focus on convergence 
and competitiveness should remain – as foundations of resilient outcomes, but we 
recommend that consideration should also be given to features identified as promoting 
the longer-term resilience of regions (including risk-sharing and stabilization 
mechanisms). 
 
We recommend that policy actions should be shaped by the places in which they are 
to act.  Place-shaped policy making is an essential component for economic resilience.  
The effects of individual shocks vary across time and space.  This adds weight to 
Territorial Agenda 2020.  Place-shaped policy making is a collective, multi-level, 
endeavor centred on locally-based expertise, coupled with national and international 
resources and knowledge.   
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We recommend that the economic resilience is regarded as a shared responsibility 
across all governance scales.  The form that this takes will vary by place and depend 
on institutional context.  To encourage stronger economic resilience at the regional 
scale we further recommend that the capability of local and regional authorities is 
strengthened and cross-national learning encouraged. 
 
We recommend that regional, national and international authorities begin considering 
their state of preparedness for a future economic shock now.  As part of this process 
we recommend that regions begin a real-time heathcheck of the vulnerability of the 
local economy to potential, yet unknown, shocks and an assessment of its socio-
economic adaptive capacity and capability.   
Further research 
Our research has been based on a comprehensive data exercise, and there are few data 
gaps in the key indicator sets.  Our work suggests the following as worthwhile areas 
for future exploration: 
 A deeper examination of the significance of territorial characteristics for 
resilience outcomes. 
 Research into the complex inter-relationships between resilience 
characteristics within places, which traditional multi-variate techniques have 
found challenging to assess. 
 To continue to consider the longer-term transformative effects of the crisis 
which will play out over a longer duration, and lay the foundations for future 
resilience outcomes 
 To further explore the role of agency and adaptive capability in the responses 
of businesses, households and communities to economic shocks.   
 A deeper assessment of the role of government in promoting resilience 
outcomes, particularly through adaptive system-strengthening activities 
 Appropriate metrics for dynamic, realtime analysis of resilience processes, to 
help inform adaptive policy making, as opposed to static comparative models. 
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